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Article 
From Al-Qaida in 2001 to ISIL in 2015:  
The Security Council’s Decisions on Terrorism 
and Their Impact on the Right to Self-Defense 
Against Autonomous Non-State Actors 
Alberto Alvarez-Jimenez 
“The fortunes of war more than any other are liable to 
frequent fluctuations,” said Don Quixote. Prominent voices 
certainly embraced this logic regarding a right to self-defense 
against autonomous non-State actors shortly after 9/11,1 mainly 
 
  Senior lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Waikato, New Zealand - 
aalvarez@waikato.ac.nz. This Article covers the Security Council’s decisions on 
the topic until November 25, 2015. The author is grateful to the Faculty of Law 
of the University of Waikato for its significant support. Earlier versions of this 
Article were presented at the Conference, “The UN at 70: Guaranteeing 
Security and Justice” (The Hague, 2015); the International Organizations 
Workshop organized by the American Society of International Law (Columbia 
Law School, 2014); the 2014 Conference of the Australian and New Zealand 
Society of International Law (Canberra, Australia); the 2014 Beeby Colloquium 
organized by the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 
(Wellington, New Zealand); and the Annual Conference of the Canadian Council 
of International Law (Ottawa, 2013). The author is grateful to Kristen Boon, 
Sarah Dadush, Joanna Harrington, Claire Breen, Melissa Durkee, Ruwanthika 
Gunaratne, David Gartner, Julian Arato, Andrew Woods, David Zaring, Ben 
Heath, Alexander Gillespie, and Ben Saul for their valuable comments. All 
errors are the author’s alone. 
 1.  The label “right to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors” 
means the right to self-defense against armed attacks or threats thereof coming 
from autonomous non-State actors and aimed at the territory of the State from 
which they operate (hereinafter “innocent States”). Traditionally, autonomous 
non-State actors are those whose actions cannot be attributed to a third State, 
based on the customary rule embodied in Article 8 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, as interpreted by the 
International Court of Justice. See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and 
Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115 (June 
27). However, as this Article will illustrate below in Section IX, such analysis 
will be made in light of the Security Council’s own rules of attribution, which it 
has put in place in the domain of threats to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts. As to the customary rule, see id.; Application of the 
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as a result of Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001) adopted by the 
Security Council in the aftermath of the infamous terrorist 
attacks.2 Others argued that these resolutions had lowered the 
threshold of attribution to States of actions carried out by non-
State actors, in the sense that States would be held responsible 
for armed attacks consummated by terrorist groups that the 
former had either actively or passively supported.3 
However, the International Court of Justice (the “Court” or 
“ICJ”) held in its advisory opinion in Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory4 in 
2004 that Article 51 “recognizes the existence of an inherent 
right of self-defence in the case of armed attack by one State 
against another State.”5 This was the Court’s response to Israel’s 
 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. 
& Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 399–400 (Feb. 
26); Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. 
Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). 
 2. See Daniel Bethlehem, Self-Defense Against an Imminent or Actual 
Armed Attack by Nonstate Actors, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 769, 774 (2012); Theresa 
Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense Post-
9∕11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 248 (2011); W. Michael Reisman & Andrea 
Armstrong, The Past and Future of the Claim of Preemptive Self-Defense, 100 
AM. J. INT’L L. 525, 527–32 (2006); Michael N. Schmitt, Responding to 
Transnational Terrorism Under the Jus ad Bellum: A Normative Framework, 
56 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 3–5 (2008). To be sure, not all commentators shared this 
view post-9/11; see, e.g., CHRISTINE GRAY, The Charter Limitations on the Use 
of Force: Theory and Practice, in UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL AND 
WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 86, 97 (Vaugham 
Lowe et al. eds., 2008); Antonio Cassese, Terrorism Is Also Disrupting Some 
Crucial Legal Categories of International Law, 12 EUR. J. INT’L L. 993, 996 
(2001); Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT’L & COMP. 
L.Q. 537, 546–47 (2004); Mary Ellen O’Connell, Dangerous Departures, 107 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 380, 382 (2013); Dire Tladi, The Nonconsenting Innocent State: The 
Problem with Bethlehem’s Principle 12, 107 AM. J. INT’L L. 570, 575 (2013). 
 3. See Thomas Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After 
Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 607, 610 (2003); see also Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother 
Never Taught Me:”In Defense of the International Court,” 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 
81 (2005). 
 4. Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136 (July 9). 
 5. Id. ¶ 139; see U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter 
shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an 
armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security 
Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and 
security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence 
shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way 
affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present 
Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”). 
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invocation of Resolutions 13686 and 1373.7 Nonetheless, the 
Court said nothing on whether Resolutions 1368 and 1373 
contained a standard of attribution different from that of 
customary international law. At the same time, Judges Higgins, 
Buergenthal, and Kooijmans were of a different view: the scope 
of Article 51 is not limited to attacks carried out by States.8 
Some prominent voices did not much heed the Court as to 
the issue of autonomous non-State actors. For instance, Sir 
Daniel Bethlehem argued that “it is by now reasonably clear and 
accepted that states have a right of self-defense against attacks 
by non-state actors—as reflected, for example, in UN Security 
Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 of 2001, adopted following 
the 9∕11 attacks . . . .”9 
Has the emergence of the Islamic State in Iraq and the 
Levant (“ISIL”) and the Al Nusrah Front (“ANF”) made 
discussions on the existence of the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors irrelevant? Apparently, yes. A 
swift analysis would be as follows: the United States and United 
Kingdom invoked the right to self-defense against Al-Qaida back 
in 2001;10 the Security Council mentioned the inherent right to 
self-defense in Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001);11 the United 
States, the United Kingdom, and France invoked the right to 
self-defense in 2014 and 2015 in response to ISIL;12 and the 
Council enacted Resolution 2249 (2015), calling upon UN 
members to take all necessary measures against this terrorist 
 
 6. S.C. Res. 1368 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 7. S.C. Res. 1373 (Sept. 28, 2001). 
 8. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. at ¶ 33 (separate opinion by Higgins, R.); 
id. ¶ 6 (separate opinion by Buergenthal, T.); id. ¶ 35 (separate opinion by 
Kooijmans, P.); see also YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-
DEFENCE 229–30 (2012); Sean D. Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall 
Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit From the ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 64 (2005). 
 9. Bethlehem, supra note 2, at 774; see also DINSTEIN, supra note 8, at 
230. 
 10. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Terrorist 
Threats by Security Council President, U.N. Press Release SC/7167 (Oct. 8, 
2001) [hereinafter Press Statement on Terrorist Threats]. 
 11. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7. 
 12. See Marc Weller, Permanent Imminence of Armed Attacks: Resolution 
2249 (2015) and the Right to Self Defence Against Designated Terrorist Groups, 
EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/permanent-imminence-of-armed-attacks-resolution-
2249-2015-and-the-right-to-self-defence-against-designated-terrorist-
groups/#more-13871. 
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group.13 The right of self-defense against autonomous non-State 
actors would then be well established under Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter (“Charter”) as a result of the Council’s 
decisions. Despite the allure of this chain of events, this 
proposition does not hold true. To be sure, this is not to say that 
the understanding of this provision is the same now as it was in 
1945. This would simply ignore the reality the world is facing as 
a result of the threat that autonomous non-State actors pose for 
international peace and security. To prove this conclusion, this 
Article will follow an approach highlighted in the most recent 
evaluation of the Charter carried out by Simma, Khan, Nolte, 
and Paulus.14 
In their assessment of Article 51, Nolte and Randelzhofer 
offered an additional layer of analysis regarding its 
interpretation. They simply but acutely recalled how the 
Charter, in particular Article 51, had to be interpreted as a 
treaty in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties (“VCLT”). Thus, they opened the way for the evaluation 
of subsequent practice by expressing: 
[T]he UN Charter is to be interpreted according to the 
general rules of treaty interpretation which are codified 
in Arts 31–33 VCLT . . . In principle, the rules of treaty 
interpretation and on the sources of international law do 
not exclude the possibility that Art. 51 is reinterpreted, 
including on the basis of subsequent practice. 
Theoretically it is even possible that an additional 
exception to the general prohibition of the use of force 
could develop alongside Art. 51 by way of superseding 
customary international law. In view, however, of the 
fundamental importance of the right to self-defense for 
the Charter system of collective security, the conditions 
for the recognition of any significant reinterpretation of, 
or superseding exception to, Art 51 are strict.15 
 
 13. S.C. Res. 2249, ¶ 5 (Nov. 20, 2015). 
 14. See Georg Nolte & Albrecht Randelzhofer, Article 51, in 2 THE CHARTER 
OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1397 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2012). 
 15. Id. ¶ 4. Subsequent decisions and practices within international 
organizations are used as elements in interpreting their constitutive treaties. 
See JOSE ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 87–92 
(2005); JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL 
LAW 96–103 (2002); Jan Wouters & Philip De Man, International Organizations 
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It is on this basis that I suggest the Wall Opinion cannot be seen 
as preventing the Security Council, the General Assembly, or 
UN members from reinterpreting Article 51 through subsequent 
decisions and practice. Moreover, there is room for an 
interpretation of Article 51 that this provision does not limit its 
scope to attacks by States, as Judges Higgins, Buergenthal, and 
Kooijmans suggested in their separate opinions and declaration 
to the Court’s opinion.16 Consequently, what the Wall Opinion 
does not say, in the present author’s view and in accordance with 
the VCLT, is that Article 51 excludes per se the existence of a 
right to self-defense against such actors. However, what the Wall 
opinion can be inferred to say is that this until July 2004, this 
practice—in particular the Council’s—had not altered the 
traditional understanding of the scope of Article 51 to cover 
armed attacks by autonomous non-State actors. 
After Wall, those arguing that the right to self-defense 
against autonomous non-State actors has crystallized cannot 
base their claims solely on a reading of the text of Article 51 and 
of Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which the Court did not embrace 
in 2004. To be rigorous and convincing, the statement needs to 
be based on subsequent United Nations decisions and practice. 
The same can be said of the creation of a new standard of 
attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions in the domain 
of terrorism. 
 
as Law-Makers, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANIZATIONS 190, 192–94 (Jan Klabbers & Asa Wallendahl eds., 2011); see 
also Whaling in Antarctic (Austl. v. Japan/N.Z.), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J. Rep. 
226, ¶¶ 46–47, 137 (Mar. 31). There have been discussions during the Security 
Council’s deliberations on the potential amendment character of particular 
draft resolutions. To be sure, the issue is Janus-faced. What some States might 
consider as an amendment to a Charter provision, others might not. In this 
regard, see the discussion that took place during the adoption of Resolution 255 
(1968), which referred to measures to safeguard non-nuclear-weapons States 
parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. U.N. DEP’T 
OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF 
THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–68, Chapter XI at 217–23, 
U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.5, U.N. Sales No. F.71 VII.1 (1971) [hereinafter 
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SEC. COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–
68]. However, the point here is not whether the Security Council’s decisions and 
practices can introduce amendments to Article 51, but whether these decisions 
have adjusted the understanding of this provision to reflect new realities. 
 16. See Legal Consequences of the Construction of Wall in Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 33 (July 9) 
(separate opinion by Higgins, R.); id. ¶ 6 (separate opinion by Buergenthal, T.); 
id. ¶ 35 (separate opinion by Kooijmans, P.). 
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This Article explores to the fullest extent possible Nolte and 
Randelzhofer’s approach17 and examines the Security Council’s 
decisions and practice after Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001), 
and until Resolution 2249 (2015)—exhorting members to take 
all necessary means against ISIL.18 The Article will illustrate 
the following main conclusions after an evaluation of 37 
resolutions, 48 presidential statements enacted and issued by 
the Council, and 156 press statements made by its members: 
(i) Between 2002 and November 2015 (Resolution 
2249), there was no explicit subsequent decision 
or practice related to the right to self-defense 
against autonomous non-State actors; 
(ii) With the exception of Resolution 2249, the 
Council has consistently chosen to develop 
multilateral tools unrelated to the use of force to 
overcome terrorist threats in its 85 decisions; 
(iii) There is some evidence of what could be labelled 
as “implicit subsequent decisions and practice” 
related to the use of force in self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors from 2001 until 
right before Resolution 2249. This practice, 
however, combined with Resolutions 1268 and 
1373, has not been enough to expand the right to 
self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter 
against such terrorist entities; 
(iv) Contrary to the lack of decisions regarding 
Article 51 in this realm, the Council has made 
 
 17. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. Hakimi and Cogan offer a 
different framework of analysis from the one explored here. Although the 
present author does not fully share their approach, their article constitutes an 
important contribution to the literature. See Monica Hakimi & Jacob Katz 
Cogan, The Two Codes on the Use of Force, 27 EUR. J. INT’L L. 257, 257 (2016). 
 18. Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 14, ¶ 37 (concluding that “the 
preferable view seems to be that attacks by organized groups need to be 
attributed to a State in order to enable the affected State to exercise its right to 
self-defence”). This conclusion does not render the present Article irrelevant, for 
Nolte and Randelzhofer highlighted the argument of expansion of Article 51 
through subsequent decisions and practices without embarking upon an 
evaluation of such decisions. 
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four explicit references to this provision during 
the same period in a different context; 
(v) The International Court was right with its 
cautious approach in the Wall Opinion, which 
reflects the Council’s perspective from 2002 to 
2015; 
(vi) In 1998 the Council began creating a new 
standard of attribution to States of non-State 
actors’ actions in the domain of terrorism, which 
the Council applied to the 9/11 attacks and has 
repeatedly reaffirmed over the said period. The 
standard is different from that of customary 
international law: actions by non-State actors 
that do not meet the customary standard can 
meet the Council’s standards, be attributed to 
States, and may trigger self-defensive 
responses; 
(vii) As a result of this newly-created standard, the 
Council has indirectly expanded the 
applicability of Article 51 to respond to armed 
terrorist attacks; and 
(viii) In Resolution 2249 the Council, for the first 
time, tacitly endorsed self-defensive action 
against an autonomous non-State actor—ISIL in 
Syria and Iraq—but the resolution does not go 
beyond that. 19 
 
 19. The decisions adopted by the Security Council in the domain of threats 
to international peace and security in 2016 do not change this conclusion. In 
effect, the Council issued two resolutions on this topic. Resolution 2309 dealt 
with measures aimed at preventing terrorist attacks against the global aviation 
system. See S.C. Res. 2309 (Sept. 22, 2016). Security Council Resolution 2322 
expanded measures against ISIL and was aimed at curbing its ability to recruit 
foreign terrorist fighters and to have access to funds and financial assets. See 
S.C. Res. 2322 (Dec. 12, 2016). So did the following two statements from the 
Security Council President. First, the presidential statement of May 11, 2016, 
requested the Counter Terrorism Committee to present a proposal to the 
Council for a comprehensive international framework to counter ISIL’s 
narratives encouraging the commission of terrorist attacks. See U.N. President 
of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2016/6 (May 11, 2016). The second presidential statement took place on 
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Essentially, the Council’s decisions and practices from 2001 
to 2015 evidence that under the legal terms of the UN Charter, 
a State that has been the object of an armed attack by a non-
State actor—other than ISIL in Syria and Iraq—or is under 
imminent threat of such attack, needs to identify if the attack 
can be attributed to a State under the Council’s norms of 
attribution in the domain of terrorism. If not, the attacked State 
needs to secure, as a matter of law, the innocent State’s consent 
to carry out self-defensive action in the former’s territory under 
the well-established principle of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity enshrined in the Charter, or it needs the Security 
Council’s endorsement or a Chapter VII authorization for the 
given self-defensive action.20 Merely the existence of an armed 
attack or imminent threat by an autonomous non-State actor is 
not enough to trigger lawful self-defensive action under the UN 
Charter on the basis of the Council’s subsequent decisions and 
practices. 
I. SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS AND PRACTICES 
AND HOW TO INTERPRET THEM 
The Security Council operates through a diverse set of 
instruments: binding resolutions; non-binding resolutions; and 
presidential statements.21 However, it is important to note that 
the label “presidential statements” is slightly inaccurate, as the 
statement comes directly from the Council in a formal meeting, 
after informal consultations of the whole involving negotiations 
of each paragraph, and it is merely read out by the president.22 
More importantly, these statements constitute decisions of the 
 
May 13, 2016, and was related to Boko Haram. The Council commended the 
governments of Cameroon, Chad, Niger, and Nigeria for their regional efforts 
against this terrorist group. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2016/7 (May 13, 2016). 
 20. The U.N. Charter establishes only two exceptions to the prohibition of 
the use of force: the Council’s enforcement actions pursuant to Chapter VII, and 
the right to individual and collective self-defense set forth in Art. 51. See Nolte 
& Randelzhofer, supra note 14, ¶ 3. 
 21. See generally U.N. President of the S.C., Note dated July 26, 2010, U.N. 
Doc. S/2010/507 (July 26, 2010) [hereinafter U.N. President of the S.C July 2010 
Note] (explaining that the U.N. Security Council uses various forms of 
documentation to communicate their initiatives). 
 22. See Stefan Talmon, The Statements by the President of the Security 
Council, 2 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 419, 419 (2003); Michael C. Wood, Security 
Council Working Methods and Procedure: Recent Developments, 45 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 150, 154 n.12 (1996). 
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Security Council under Article 27 of the Charter,23 a conclusion 
supported by States’ practice and the UN Secretariat.24 In terms 
of ranking, Sievers and Daws say, “there is no hierarchy among 
Council decisions created because of the format in which they 
are ‘published.’”25 So, a binding decision can exist in a 
presidential statement, too.26 It all depends on the substantive 
content.27 However, there is another reality highlighted by these 
authors: “[b]ecause of the common perception that a resolution 
‘carries more weight’ . . . than a presidential statement, the 
Council has tended to publish all of its major operational 
decisions as resolutions.”28 In practice, no Chapter VII decision 
has been imparted in a presidential statement.29 In addition to 
these decisions, the Council also issues annual reports, which 
are sent to the UN General Assembly by virtue of Article 24(3) 
of the Charter and which are approved by all of its members.30 
Finally, there is another type of practice worth mentioning: 
statements to the press. They are made orally by the Security 
Council President (the “President”), on behalf of the members of 
the Council and on the basis of general guidelines determined 
after informal consultations.31 These statements, however, do 
not constitute decisions under Article 2732 but are still 
considered important by the Council itself, which has regulated 
their discussion process33 and included them among the 
information available to the public on the Council’s website.34 In 
 
 23. See Andreas Zimmermann, Article 27, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE 
UNITED NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 871, ¶ 73 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 
2012). 
 24. See Talmon, supra note 22, at 448. 
 25. LORAINE SIEVERS & SAM DAWS, THE PROCEDURE OF THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL 375 (4th ed. 2014). 
 26. See id. at 381. These authors also present evidence of the Council’s 
practice of events of binding nature of presidential statements and Notes of the 
President. See id. at 375–76. 
 27. See id. at 374. But see Talmon, supra note 22, at 452. 
 28. SIEVERS & DAWS, supra note 25, at 376–78. 
 29. See id. at 378. 
 30. See U.N. President of the S.C. July Note, supra note 21, at 12–15. 
 31. See Wood, supra note 22, at 154; Talmon, supra note 22, at 430. 
 32. See Zimmermann, supra note 23, at 74; Talmon, supra note 22, at 448–
49. 
 33. See U.N. President of the S.C. July Note, supra note 21, at 9, ¶ 42. 
 34. Links to the Security Council’s press releases can be found, in reverse 
chronological order, at in the main webpage of the United Nations Security 
Council. See U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/ (last visited 
April 4, 2017). 
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any case, they constitute declarations by the members of the 
Council regarding particular topics. 
The issue then is how to interpret these subsequent 
decisions and practices made by the Council when assessing 
whether they have achieved expansion of Article 51. The 
International Court first expressed in the Advisory Opinion in 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South 
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security 
Council Resolution 276 (1970), 
The language of a resolution of the Security Council 
should be carefully analysed . . . having regard to the 
terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions 
leading to it, the Charter provisions invoked and, in 
general, all circumstances that might assist in 
determining the legal consequences . . . .35 
Most recently, the Court expressed in its advisory opinion in 
Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo: 
The interpretation of Security Council resolutions may 
require the Court to analyse [sic] statements by 
representatives of members of the Security Council made 
at the time of their adoption, other resolutions of the 
Security Council on the same issue, as well as the 
subsequent practice of relevant United Nations organs 
and of States affected by those given resolutions.36 
As can be seen, the Court highlights “other resolutions on the 
same subject” as elements to be taken into consideration at the 
time of interpretation of specific resolutions. Presidential 
statements can also be used to interpret Security Council 
resolutions as part of the subsequent practice the Court 
mentioned in the Kosovo advisory opinion. In fact, the Court 
 
 35. Legal Consequences for States of Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 
276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, 1971 I.C.J. Rep. 16, ¶ 114 (June 21). 
 36. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, 
¶ 94 (July 22). 
2017] FROM AL-QAIDA IN 2001 TO ISIL IN 2015 355 
used statements of this nature when interpreting the applicable 
resolutions in this opinion.37 
Finally, the fact that the International Court has said that 
other resolutions on the same issue are relevant for the purpose 
of interpretations of particular resolutions has an impact on the 
scope of the subsequent practice to be assessed for the purpose 
of the inquiry carried out here. Indeed, the Council included 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 within the topic “threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts,”38 so 
 
 37. See id. ¶ 91. 
 38. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6; S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7. It is 
important to note that, despite the fact that the Council has rendered 85 
decisions under the label “threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts,” there is no general definition of the term “terrorism” in 
international law. The closest the Security Council has come to a definition is 
provided in Resolution 1566, where the Council stated: 
[C]riminal acts, including against civilians, committed with the intent 
to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking of hostages, with the 
purpose to provoke a state of terror in the general public or in a group 
of persons or particular persons, intimidate a population or compel a 
government or an international organization to do or to abstain from 
doing any act, which constitute offences within the scope of and as 
defined in the international conventions and protocols relating to 
terrorism, are under no circumstances justifiable by considerations of 
a political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other 
similar nature, and calls upon all States to prevent such acts and, if 
not prevented, to ensure that such acts are punished by penalties 
consistent with their grave nature. 
S.C. Res. 1566, ¶ 3 (Oct. 8, 2004); see also Michael Wood, The Role of the UN 
Security Council in Relation to the Use of Force Against Terrorists, in COUNTER-
TERRORISM STRATEGIES IN A FRAGMENTED INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: 
MEETING THE CHALLENGES 317, 323 (Larissa Van den Kerik & Nico Schrijver 
eds., 2013). However, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon defined, for the first 
time, terrorism in international law in the following terms: 
On the basis of treaties, UN resolutions and the legislative and judicial 
practice of States, there is convincing evidence that a customary rule 
of international law has evolved on terrorism in time of peace, 
requiring the following elements: (i) the intent (dolus) of the 
underlying crime and (ii) the special intent (dolus specialis) to spread 
fear or coerce authority; (iii) the commission of a criminal act, and (iv) 
that the terrorist act be transnational. 
Ayyash et al., Case No. STL-11-01/I, Interlocutory Decision on the Applicable 
Law: Terrorism, Conspiracy, Homicide, Perpetration, Cumulative Charging, 3 
(Special Trib. for Lebanon Feb. 16, 2011). On the topic of a definition of 
terrorism, see BEN SAUL, DEFINING TERRORISM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 
(2006) (explaining that there is no one absolute, correct definition of terrorism 
due to the word’s subjective and political nature); ANTHONY AUST, HANDBOOK 
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 264–67 (2010); Marcello Di Filippo, Terrorist Crimes 
and International Co-operation: Critical Remarks on the Definition and 
Inclusion of Terrorism in the Category of International Crimes, 19 EUR. J. INT’L 
L. 533, 539, 546 (2008); Ben Saul, Terrorism as a Transnational Crime, in 
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for the purpose of identifying subsequent decisions and practices 
by the Council related to the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors that could have expanded Article 
51, this Article will assess 37 resolutions, 48 presidential 
statements, and 156 press statements catalogued by the Council 
as being made under the said label over the period 2001–15. This 
Article will also look at 13 Annual Reports to the General 
Assembly issued by the Council, as well as the Repertoire of 
Practice of the Security Council concerning Article 51.39 Only 
after reviewing all of these decisions can an interpreter conclude 
whether or not the subsequent practice has expanded the scope 
of Article 51 of the Charter to cover self-defensive actions against 
armed attacks from autonomous non-State actors and whether 
or not the subsequent practice has created or reaffirmed a 
particular standard of attribution to States of acts performed by 
non-State actors in the domain of terrorism.40 
II. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND 
PRACTICES IN RESPONSE TO THE 9/11 
TERRORIST ATTACKS 
Resolution 1368 condemned the 9/11 attacks, recognized 
“the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense in 
accordance with the Charter,”41 and called on States to work 
together “to bring to justice perpetrators, organizers and 
sponsors of these terrorist attacks . . . . ”42 On September 21, 
2001, the President issued a press statement on behalf of the 
members of the Council, in which he provided a broader context 
 
HANDBOOK OF TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 394 (N. Boister & R. Currie eds., 
2015). 
 39. The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council covers the period 
from 1946 to 2011. See The Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council, 
UNITED NATIONS, http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/actions.shtml (last visited 
Mar. 28, 2017). 
 40. This Article has also included a review of Notes by the President of the 
Security Council regarding threats to international peace and security caused 
by terrorist acts. There was nothing relevant in them. 
 41. See S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6, pmbl. ¶ 3. 
 42. See id. ¶ 3. On September 13, 2001, the President of the Security 
Council issued a note acknowledging the receipt of communications sent by the 
representatives of Australia, Belgium (on behalf of the European Union), Brazil, 
Cuba, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, Romania, Slovenia, and Yugoslavia, in 
which the terrorist attacks were condemned. See U.N. President of the S.C., 
Note by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2001/864 (Sept. 13, 
2001). 
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to Resolution 1368; in particular, he highlighted 12 
international conventions dealing with different dimensions of 
terrorism and anticipated the adoption of resolutions of a 
general nature, which in effect the Council adopted when it 
issued Resolution 1373.43 
Resolution 1373 (2001) reaffirmed the inherent right to self-
defense44 as well as “the need to combat by all means, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts.”45 The 
resolution also provided that: 
[A]ll States shall: 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or 
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, 
including by suppressing recruitment of members of 
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons 
to terrorists; 
. . . 
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, 
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens . . . .46 
In addition, Resolution 1373 called on “States to work together 
urgently to prevent and suppress terrorist acts . . . .”47 It 
mandated States to criminalize the willful provision or collection 
of funds by their nationals to be used for terrorist purposes, 
ordered the freeze of assets of persons involved in terrorist 
actions, and called for the prohibition of nationals to make funds 
 
 43. See Press Release, Security Council, Note by President of Security 
Council, U.N. Press Release S/2001/864 (Sept. 29, 2001). 
 44. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 4. In addition to the United 
Kingdom and the United States, Canada, France, Australia, Germany, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Poland, Belgium (on behalf of General Affairs 
Council of the European Union), Norway, Egypt, Malaysia, and Chile (on behalf 
of State members of the Rio Group) supported the invocation of Article 51 under 
the circumstances. See U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, 
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 
2000–03, Chapter XI at 1005–06, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.14, U.N. Sales No. 
[not provided] (2011) [hereinafter REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. 
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03]. 
 45. See S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 7, pmbl. ¶ 5. 
 46. Id. ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c). 
 47. Id. pmbl. ¶ 7. 
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available to those involved in terrorist actions. Resolution 1373 
also called upon UN members to become parties to conventions 
related to terrorism, created a Committee of the Security 
Council to monitor implementation of the resolution, and 
ordered States to report to the Committee on the steps they had 
taken in this direction. 
In essence, Resolution 1373 has both unilateral and 
multilateral dimensions, but this does not mean that the two 
natures are of the same degree. In fact, the unilateral dimension 
in Resolution 1373 is present in its preamble only, while the 
multilateral character is present both in the preamble and, more 
importantly, in the operative part of the resolution. This is a 
distinction worth keeping in mind. 
On October 8, 2001, the President released a press 
statement on behalf of the members of the Council closely 
related to Resolutions 1368 and 1373 (2001). In it, the President 
stated: 
I might recall that the Security Council reacted to the 
attacks of 11 September, first through resolution 1368, 
and then through resolution 1373, which took direct aim 
at the financing and support of international terrorism. 
The members of the Council are determined to see the 
full implementation of these resolutions. 
The members of the Security Council took note of the 
letters that the representatives of the United States and 
of the United Kingdom sent yesterday to the President of 
the Security Council, in accordance with Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter, in which they state that the 
action was taken in accordance with the inherent right 
of individual and collective self-defence following the 
terrorist attacks in the United States of 11 September 
2001.48 
One month after the attacks, the members of the Council made 
a press statement in which they announced the appointment of 
the members of the Committee that Resolution 1373 had 
established to monitor its implementation.49 
 
 48. See Press Statement on Terrorist Threats, supra note 10. 
 49. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on ‘Terrorism 
Committee’ by President of Security Council, U.N. Press Release SC/7163 (Oct. 
4, 2001). 
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Another decision by the Council adopted in relation to the 
9/11 attacks was Resolution 1377 (2001).50 The decision 
contained a declaration by the Council on the global effort 
against terrorism, recalled, among others, the 9/11 resolutions,51 
and declared that international terrorism was a serious threat 
to peace and security and was contrary to the purposes and 
principles of the Charter.52 The resolution affirmed that active 
participation and collaboration of UN members, in accordance 
with the Charter, was essential to combat terrorism.53 The 
Council also began setting the basis for the strengthening of the 
Counter-Terrorism Committee (“CTC”), first, by recognizing 
that States may need assistance to implement Resolution 1373, 
and second, by authorizing the CTC to explore ways to provide 
it.54 
Finally, the Council issued a press statement 
commemorating the first anniversary of the 9/11 attacks, in 
which it endorsed the actions carried out in self-defense by the 
United States and the United Kingdom against the Taliban and 
Al-Qaida: 
The international community has responded to the 
atrocities of 11 September with unyielding 
determination. A broad coalition of States has taken 
action against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their 
supporters. It did so in defence of common values and 
common security. Consistent with the high purposes of 
this institution and the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, the coalition continues to pursue those 
responsible.55 
Despite the fact that the Court just mentioned Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 in the Wall opinion, these resolutions, plus the 
presidential statements already mentioned, are the decisions by 
the Council that the Court implicitly regarded as insufficient to 
expand Article 51 against autonomous non-State actors. 
 
 50. See S.C. Res. 1377 (Nov. 12, 2001). 
 51. See id. ¶ 3. 
 52. See id. ¶ 4. 
 53. See id. ¶ 9. 
 54. See id. ¶¶ 14–15. 
 55. U.N. Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/25 (Sept. 11, 2002) [hereinafter Statement 
by the President of the Security Council on Sept. 11, 2002]. 
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Before proceeding, note that for the right to self-defense 
against autonomous non-State actors to exist, there is an 
important trade-off: namely, the territorial integrity of the State 
from which the autonomous non-State actor operates, whose 
consent is not required. This is because the self-defending State, 
by virtue of the existence of the right, would not need to get the 
State’s consent prior to carrying out the self-defensive action. 
Differently put, with the existence of an armed attack, the right 
to self-defense would trump the right to territorial integrity of 
the State from which the non-State actor operates. The right to 
self-defense against such acts would exist under Article 51 only 
once UN members recognized an exception to the right to 
territorial integrity of the non-consenting State. The coexistence 
of the two rights would exist only in the event of such consent. 
The sole exception, as will be seen, is endorsement or Chapter 
VII authorization by the Security Council to take all necessary 
measures against an autonomous non-State actor. 
III. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST ISIL 
AND RESOLUTION 2249 (2015) 
Given the impression that Resolution 2249 may have 
confirmed the existence of the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors—and because Article 51 had been 
invoked against ISIL by Iraq and the United States since 2014,56 
with the opposition of Russia and China, which claimed that all 
military operations in Syria required its consent57—it is 
 
 56. See U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Sept. 23, 2014 from the 
Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United 
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. S/2014/695 (Sep. 23, 
2014). 
 57. See Ben Blanchard, China Gives Cautious Response to Obama’s Islamic 
State Call, REUTERS (Sept. 11, 2014, 4:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2014/09/11/iraq-crisis-china-idUSL3N0RC23K20140911 (statement of 
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying) (“China opposes all 
forms of terrorism, and upholds that the international community must jointly 
cooperate to strike against terrorism, including supporting efforts by relevant 
countries to maintain domestic security and stability[.] . . . At the same time, 
we also uphold that in the international fight against terrorism, international 
law should be respected and the sovereignty, independence and territorial 
integrity of relevant nations should also be respected . . . .”). For Russia’s 
statement, see Ian Black & Dan Roberts, Isis Air Strikes: Obama’s Plan 
Condemned by Syria, Russia and Iran, GUARDIAN (Sep. 12, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/11/assad-moscow-tehran-
condemn-obama-isis-air-strike-plan (statement of Russian spokesman) (“The 
US president has spoken directly about the possibility of strikes by the US 
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important to assess that resolution. To begin with, the Council 
has defined ISIL as an autonomous non-State actor by 
dissociating its actions from both Iraq and Syria in Resolution 
2199 (2015): 
Reaffirming the independence, sovereignty, unity and 
territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq and the Syrian 
Arab Republic, and reaffirming further the purposes and 
principles of the Charter of the United Nations, . . . 
Noting with concern the continued threat posed to 
international peace and security by ISIL, ANF and all 
other individuals, groups, undertakings and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida, and reaffirming its resolve to 
address all aspects of that threat.58 
In Resolution 2249, and after condemning ISIL’s attacks in 
Paris, Beirut, Turkey, and the Sinai, the Council notes that this 
group “has the capability and intention to carry out further 
attacks and regards all such acts of terrorism as a threat to 
peace and security.”59 
[The Council] [c]alls upon Member States that have the 
capacity to do so to take all necessary measures, in 
compliance with international law, in particular with the 
United Nations Charter, as well as international human 
rights, refugee and humanitarian law, on the territory 
under the control of ISIL also known as Da’esh, in Syria 
and Iraq, to redouble and coordinate their efforts to 
prevent and suppress terrorist acts committed 
specifically by ISIL also known as Da’esh as well as ANF, 
and all other individuals, groups, undertakings, and 
entities associated with Al Qaeda, and other terrorist 
groups, as designated by the United Nations Security 
Council, and as may further be agreed by the 
International Syria Support Group (ISSG) and endorsed 
by the UN Security Council, pursuant to the statement 
of the International Syria Support Group (ISSG) of 14 
 
armed forces against Isil positions in Syria without the consent of the legitimate 
government[.] . . . This step, in the absence of a UN security council decision, 
would be an act of aggression, a gross violation of international law.”). 
 58. S.C. Res. 2199, pmbl. ¶¶ 7, 22 (Feb. 12, 2015). 
 59. S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, ¶ 1. 
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November, and to eradicate the safe haven they have 
established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria . . . .60 
Early assessments of the resolution pointed at its 
ambiguity, in particular its use of Chapter VII language without 
explicitly invoking its powers and calling upon States to take 
necessary measures without actually mandating or deciding the 
adoption of any measure.61 According to Akande and Milanovic, 
the resolution does “not provide for the use of force against ISIS 
either in Syria or in Iraq;”62 a conclusion shared by Weller.63 
Deeks is of the view that Resolution 2249 is mainly an exercise 
of soft power by the Council and blurs the “long-standing bright 
line between Chapter VII resolutions that authorize force and 
those that do not.”64 However, although critical of the Council, 
Starski argues that the resolution legitimizes self-defense 
without Syrian consent.65 Commenting on Resolution 2249, Sir 
Michael Wood, a member of the UN International Law 
Commission, disagrees with the argument of ambiguity and 
expresses: 
[I]t is difficult to read the resolution otherwise than as 
an endorsement, in the circumstances, of the use of force 
in self-defence against an ongoing or imminent armed 
attack by Da’esh, a non-State actor. Paragraph 5 of the 
resolution itself referred to the need “to prevent and 
suppress terrorist acts committed specifically by ISIL 
also known as Da’esh as well as [by other specified 
terrorist groups]”. No one at the Council meeting at 
which the resolution was adopted suggested otherwise.66 
 
 60. Id. ¶ 5. 
 61. Dapo Akande & Marko Milanovic, The Constructive Ambiguity of the 
Security Council’s ISIS Resolution, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. 
(Nov. 21, 2015), http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-constructive-ambiguity-of-the-
security-councils-isis-resolution/. 
 62. Id. 
 63. See Weller, supra note 12. 
 64. Ashley Deeks, Threading the Needle in Security Council Resolution 
2249, LAWFARE (Nov. 23, 2015, 3:25 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/
threading-needle-security-council-resolution-2249. 
 65. See Paulina Starski, “Legitimized Self-Defense” – Quo Vadis Security 
Council?, EJIL: TALK!: BLOG OF THE EUR. J. INT’L L. (Dec. 10, 2015), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/legitimized-self-defense-quo-vadis-security-
council/#more-13897. 
 66. Michael Wood, The Use of Force in 2015 With Particular Reference to 
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The resolution is not a Chapter VII resolution, which means 
neither that it is not binding nor that it lacks important legal 
effects.67 The resolution does not authorize UN Members to carry 
out any particular actions against ISIL, but it does, among other 
things, endorse military actions against this terrorist group. The 
scope of the exhortation is vast and long term: (i) to prevent 
terrorist acts by ISIL and present and even future associate 
entities; (ii) to suppress their terrorist acts; and (iii) to eradicate 
the safe haven that ISIL has established in Iraq and Syria. The 
resolution has also a territorial limitation: the measures the 
Council calls upon States to take must be carried out in the 
territory controlled by ISIL and no further. Thus, Syrian 
territory controlled by the Syrian army cannot be targeted on the 
basis of the resolution, meaning that the exception to the 
principle of territorial integrity is also geographically 
constrained: a constraint that must be respected, for the 
resolution recalls such principle in its preamble.68 
 As to the reasons for the wording of paragraph 5, a UK 
House of Commons’ document expresses: 
This careful wording implicitly supports states’ existing 
military actions against specific terrorist groups in those 
countries without either explicitly accepting or rejecting 
the various competing justifications or clearly providing 
a new stand-alone legal basis or authorisation for those 
actions. 
The result is that states are likely to continue relying on 
the other varying legal arguments they have been using 
up until now, despite the disagreement between Russia 
and other states.69 
This could be a reason why Resolution 2249 was not adopted 
under Chapter VII.70 
Equally important is that the resolution does not impose 
any explicit restriction on States to claim the right to self-
 
Syria 8 (Hebrew U. Jerusalem, Res. Paper No. 16-05, 2016). 
 67. See Weller, supra note 12; Akande & Milanovic, supra note 61. 
 68. See S.C. Res. 2249 (2015), supra note 13, pmbl. ¶ 2. 
 69. Arabella Lang, Legal Basis for UK Military Action in Syria, HOUSE OF 
COMMONS BRIEFING PAPERS NO. 7404 (Dec. 1, 2015), http://research
briefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-7404/CBP-7404.pdf. 
 70. Personal conversation with a public official from a non-permanent 
Security Council member who took part in the negotiations. 
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defense, so States still can invoke the right against ISIL.71 In 
fact, the resolution has important implications for the right to 
self-defense against this group. First, States no longer need 
Syria and/or Iraq’s consent to lawfully take self-defensive 
actions against ISIL.72 The existence of an attack and even of a 
threat suffices for the use of use of force in self-defense. Second, 
it is important to highlight that the resolution creates an 
exception to the obligation to respect the territorial integrity of 
Syria only,73 but not to other requirements of the right of self-
defense, such as necessity and proportionality. The latter two 
must be complied with by any UN Member acting in self-defense 
upon the resolution as part of its express order that all necessary 
measures must comply with the Charter and international law.74 
Additionally, the call made by the Council is wider and 
encompasses not only States that have been the object of 
terrorist attacks or terrorist threats by ISIL, but also any State 
that has the capabilities to contribute to the eradication of the 
group’s safe haven in Syria and Iraq. The resolution then goes 
well beyond the confines of self-defense as to ISIL.75 
Moreover, it is important to identify what Resolution 2249 
does not provide for. It does not establish the right to self-defense 
against any autonomous non-State actors in any part of the 
world. Consequently, it does not endorse the use of self-defensive 
force on the basis only of the existence of terrorist threats or 
attack by any autonomous terrorist organizations. The 
resolution is circumscribed to ISIL, has a geographic limitation, 
and there is no similar endorsement to dispense with the 
 
 71. See Nolte & Randelzhofer, supra note 14, at 1428. 
 72. Consequently, Assad’s statement calling the United Kingdom’s 
operation against ISIL in Syria after Resolution 2249 “illegal” lacks merit. As 
to the declaration, see Assad says Britain’s Syria Strikes ‘Illegal’, Will 
Encourage Terror, MSN NEWS (June 12, 2015), http://www.msn.com/en-
nz/news/world/assad-says-britains-syria-strikes-illegal-will-encourage-
terror/ar-AAg50o6?li=AA59FU&ocid=mailsignout. 
 73. Germany was of this view in its communication to the Security Council 
invoking Article 51 and Resolution 2249 as bases for its actions against ISIL in 
Syria. See U.N. Security Council, Letter dated Dec. 10, 2015 from the Chargé 
d’affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Germany to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/946 (Dec. 
10, 2015). The United Kingdom made a similar argument. See U.N. Security 
Council, Letter dated Dec. 3, 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/928 (Dec. 
3, 2015). 
 74. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, ¶ 5. 
 75. Id. 
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obligation to respect the territorial integrity of innocent States, 
if the given non-State actors’ action cannot be attributed to a 
State under the rules of attribution that the Security Council 
has established in the domain of terrorism, as will be seen below 
in Section IX. 
If Resolution 2249 does not create a right of self-defense 
against autonomous non-State actors in general, the question 
becomes whether or not such a right already existed as a result 
of the Security Council’s decisions prior to Resolution 2249. The 
answer is negative; there was no explicit decision by the Council 
in relation to Article 51 and autonomous non-State actors other 
than the 9/11 resolutions from 2002 and before Resolution 2249. 
Eighty-four decisions were made by the Council during this time, 
all aimed at designing a multilateral framework to deal with 
terrorist threats to international peace and security, which were 
unrelated to the use of force. These Security Council decisions 
are important for the interpretation of the scope of Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 (2001) and, ultimately, of Resolution 2249. 
IV. THE SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS AND 
PRACTICES OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL 
RELATED TO THREATS TO INTERNATIONAL 
PEACE AND SECURITY CAUSED BY NON-
STATE ACTORS FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER 
2015 BEFORE RESOLUTION 2249: NO EXPLICIT 
EXPANSION OF ARTICLE 51 
The purposes of this section are twofold: first, to show that 
the Council made a consistent choice to rely on a multilateral 
effort to address the threat to international peace and security 
caused by terrorist acts; and second, to describe and illustrate 
with certain detail the scope and elements of the multilateral 
tools. Such detailed description is necessary for interpreters to 
answer fundamental questions, such as the potential existence 
of implicit subsequent practices able to expand Article 51 to 
cover autonomous non-State actors.76 
 
 76. What follows in this section and, particularly its footnotes, is tiresome, 
but indispensable. An important part of this Article rests on the descriptions 
contained herein, which constitute the necessary background—based on what 
the International Court stated in Kosovo—of any assessment of whether 
subsequent decisions have explicitly expanded Article 51 to cover autonomous 
non-State actors. However, those who are familiar with the different 
dimensions of the 85 decisions made by the Council over the said period can 
skip this Section and move on to Section V. 
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As will be seen in this section, the choice of multilateral 
instruments to face terrorist threats has been clear from 2002 to 
2015.77 The elements of these tools are several. Some of them are 
the following: (i) Council’s mandate to members to adopt or apply 
existing domestic legislation to carry out the measures ordered 
by the Council; (ii) the creation and/or strengthening of several 
sanctions committees made up of the members of the Council 
and the expansion and refinement of their working procedures; 
(iii) close monitoring by the committee of compliance by UN 
members with the given resolutions; (iv) coordination between 
the Security Council sanctions committees and between them 
and other UN organs; (v) coordination between the committees 
and other international, regional, and sub-regional 
organizations; and (v) cooperation between UN members in their 
counter-terrorism efforts.78 
In addition to this type of decision, the Council and its 
members made other decisions included in resolutions, 
presidential statements, and statements to the press 
condemning terrorist attacks in several countries. In all of them, 
the need to comply with Resolution 1373 and to cooperate with 
the affected countries to bring to justice the perpetrators was 
recalled.79 
 
 77. This choice has not been the only one made by the Council regarding 
threats to international peace and security caused by terrorist acts. It was 
already said that Resolution 2249 endorsed self-defensive actions against ISIL 
without Syrian consent. Furthermore, as will be explained in Section IX, from 
1998 to 2015 the Council has created and reaffirmed a new standard of 
attribution to States of acts carried out by non-State actors in this domain. 
 78. Section IV is descriptive in character. No comment is included on the 
faults or merits of the Security Council’s decisions presented below, as this 
section’s purpose is to answer the question of whether subsequent decisions by 
the Council on threats to international peace and security have expanded 
Article 51 to cover armed attacks by autonomous non-State actors. On the 
Council’s counter-terrorism decisions from a multilateral angle, see, for 
example, Andreas Paulus, Article 29, in 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED 
NATIONS: A COMMENTARY 1004–09 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012); Jane 
Boulden, The Security Council and Terrorism, in UNITED NATIONS SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND WAR: THE EVOLUTION OF THOUGHT AND PRACTICE SINCE 1945 
608 (Vaughan Lowe et al. eds., 2008); Andrea Bianchi, Assessing the 
Effectiveness of the UN Security Council’s Anti-Terrorism Measures: The Quest 
for Legitimacy and Cohesion, 17 EUR. J. INT’L L. 881 (2006). For a critical 
perspective, see Andrew Hudson, Not a Great Asset: The UN Security Council 
Counter-Terrorism Regime: Violating Human Rights, 25 BERKELEY. J. INT’L L. 
203 (2007). 
 79. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1530, ¶ 3 (Mar. 11, 2004); S.C. Res. 1611, ¶ 3 (July 
7, 2005); see also U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/18 (Apr. 25, 2006); U.N. President 
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A. THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND PRACTICES ON 
TERRORISM FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER 2015 
1. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2002 
In 2002, the Security Council adopted five resolutions 
related to terrorist threats. Resolutions 139080 and 145281 dealt 
with an existing multilateral instrument—namely, the 
Resolution 1267 Committee—and were adopted under Chapter 
VII.82 The remaining three resolutions—1438, 1440 , and 1450—
contained political statements condemning terrorist attacks in 
Bali, Russia, and Kenya.83 In addition to the presidential 
statement on the first anniversary of 9/11 mentioned above,84 
the Council issued three presidential statements in 2002 related 
to the operation of one of the multilateral instruments, the 
CTC.85 Finally, there was one press statement issued by the 
 
of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. 
S/PSRT/2008/19 (June 2, 2008). 
 80. Resolution 1390 held that the Taliban regime had violated prior 
resolutions and condemned that group for allowing Afghanistan to be a base for 
Al Qaida. The Council decided to continue measures aimed at freezing Taliban 
property and funds, established by Resolution 1267. In effect, Resolution 1267 
created a Committee (the Resolution 1267 Committee), consisting of all 
members of the Council, and given the task of ensuring UN Members’ 
compliance with the resolution through the implementation of the following 
measures: freeze of the Taliban’s assets and a denial of takeoff or landing to 
aircrafts owned, leased, or operated by or on behalf of the Taliban. The 
resolution also called upon States to bring proceedings against individuals or 
entities that violated the measures and to report to the Committee on 
implementation. See S.C. Res. 1267 (Oct. 15, 1999). Resolution 1390 also 
established new measures against the Taliban and Al Qaida, created new tasks 
and duties to report for the Resolution 1267 Committee, and requested UN 
Members to report it on the implementation of the measures. See S.C. Res. 1390 
(Jan. 16, 2002). 
 81. Resolution 1452 provided for some exceptions to the freezing obligations 
of funds belonging to the Taliban pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1390. See 
S.C. Res. 1452 (Dec. 20, 2002). 
 82. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80, pmbl. ¶ 10; id., pmbl. ¶ 4. 
 83. See S.C. Res. 1438 (Oct. 14, 2002); S.C. Res. 1440 (Oct. 24, 2002); S.C. 
Res. 1450 (Dec. 12, 2002). 
 84. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 85. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/10 (Apr. 15, 2002); U.N. President of 
the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2002/26 (Oct. 8 2002); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the 
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/38 (Dec. 17, 2002). 
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members of the Council in 2002 that specifically related to 
terrorism, in which an attack in Afghanistan was reproved.86 
2. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2003 
The Security Council adopted four resolutions relating to 
terrorism in 2003. Resolution 1455, a Chapter VII decision,87 
and Resolution 1456,88 were multilateral instruments designed 
to face the threat posed by terrorism and to deal with the 
Resolution 1267 Committee and the CTC. The two other 
decisions, Resolutions 1465 and 1516, censured terrorist actions 
in Colombia and Turkey.89 The Council also made three 
presidential statements in 2003, two of which referred to the 
operation of the CTC,90 and one which condemned a terrorist 
attack in Iraq.91 There was also in 2003 a single press statement 
issued by the members of the Council related to the operation of 
a multilateral instrument, the Resolution 1267 Committee.92 
 
 86. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on Afghanistan 
by Security Council President, U.N. Press Release SC/7497 (Sep. 6, 2002). 
 87. Resolution 1455 established better coordination between the Resolution 
1267 Committee and the CTC. Resolution 1455 also called upon members to 
prevent violations of the Council’s resolutions against terrorist groups and to 
inform the Resolution 1267 Committee of all investigations and enforcement 
actions. This resolution also created a Monitoring Group charged with the tasks 
of monitoring implementation by members of the measures ordered by the 
Council and of identifying incomplete implementation. See S.C. Res. 1455 (Jan. 
17, 2003). 
 88. Resolution 1456 was portrayed by the Council as a high-level meeting 
of the Security Council on combating terrorism, and it was a decision containing 
a political declaration that summarized the main elements of the anti-terrorism 
strategy put in place by the Council up to that point. The Council explicitly 
acknowledged that strong multilateral cooperation was the key to dealing with 
terrorism. The Council then called upon States to prevent and suppress active 
and passive support for terrorism; to cooperate fully in the investigation, 
prosecution, and punishment of acts of terrorism; to bring to justice those who 
financed, planned, supported, or committed terrorist actions; and to report to 
the CTC fully and promptly. This resolution also requested that the CTC 
intensify the efforts to achieve the implementation by UN members of 
Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1456 (Jan. 20, 2003). 
 89. See S.C. Res. 1465 (Feb. 13, 2003); S.C. Res. 1516 (Nov. 20, 2003). 
 90. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2003/3 (Apr. 4, 2003); U.N. President of the 
S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2003/17 (Oct. 16, 2003). 
 91. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PSRT/2003/13 (Aug. 20, 2003). 
 92. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement by Security 
Council President Following Briefing by Chair of Committee Monitoring 
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3. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2004 
The Council handed down four resolutions in 2004 dealing 
with threats to peace and security caused by terrorism. Three 
were in exercise of the Council’s Chapter VII powers and 
enhanced multilateral tools, the Resolution 1267 Committee and 
the CTC, to respond to this threat. They were Resolutions 
1526,93 1535,94 and 1566.95 The fourth, Resolution 1530, 
reproved a terrorist attack in Spain.96 In addition, there were 
two presidential statements made by the Council in 2004, both 
in response to terrorist attacks in Russia,97 and one press 
statement by the members condemning terrorist attacks in 
Pakistan, Egypt, and Iraq.98 
4. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2005 
The Council adopted five resolutions related to terrorism in 
2005. The Council continued to strengthen multilateral 
 
Taliban, Al-Qaida Sanctions, U.N. Press Release SC/7730 (Apr. 15, 2003). 
 93. Resolution 1526 strengthened measures to be taken by UN members 
against Al Qaida and the Taliban, their members, and other associated groups 
referred to in Resolutions 1267 and 1333. The resolution also established an 
Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team under the direction of the 
Resolution 1267 Committee and instructed the team to submit reports on 
States’ implementation of the measures adopted by the Council against Al 
Qaida and the Taliban. The resolution also invited States to report to the 
Committee any investigation and enforcement actions carried out by them. See 
S.C. Res 1526 (Jan. 30, 2004); see also S.C. Res. 1333 (Sept. 19, 2000). 
 94. Resolution 1535 reinforced the structure of the CTC by creating a 
Plenary, made up of all Security Council members, and the Bureau, composed 
of the Chair and Vice-Chairs, both assisted by the Counter-Terrorism Executive 
Directorate. The purpose of the new structure was to improve the Committee’s 
ability to implement Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1535 (Mar. 24, 2004). 
 95. Resolution 1566 called upon members to cooperate with those States 
affected by terrorist acts by finding, denying safe haven to, and bringing to 
justice those who supported, facilitated, or participated in such acts. The 
resolution called upon international organizations to cooperate with the CTC 
and requested that the latter develop a set of best practices to help States 
implement Resolution 1373. See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38. 
 96. See S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 79. 
 97. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2004/31 (Sept. 1, 2004); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2004/14 (May 10, 2004). 
 98. See Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement by Security 
Council President on Recent Terrorist Attacks, U.N. Press Release SC/8215 
(Oct. 8, 2004). 
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instruments to deal with it in Resolution 1617, a Chapter VII 
decision,99 and in Resolution 1624.100 For its part, Resolution 
1625 contained a declaration on strengthening the Council’s 
conflict prevention role in Africa in particular and reaffirmed the 
principle of refraining from the threat or use of force in 
contravention with the Charter. 101 The right to self-defense was 
not mentioned. In addition, Resolutions 1611102 and 1618103 
denounced the terrorist attacks in London and Iraq, 
respectively. Also, the Council rendered two presidential 
statements dealing with the ongoing operation of the CTC.104 
Moreover, six presidential statements were issued in 2005 in the 
aftermath of terrorist operations in Iraq, Egypt, Indonesia, 
India, and Jordan.105 Finally, there was one statement to the 
 
 99. Resolution 1617 reaffirmed the measures that members had to take 
against the individuals included in the list created by Resolutions 1267 and 
1333. The Council also defined when there was an association between Al-
Qaeda and the Taliban and other groups, and decided that such associated 
groups could also be included in the above-mentioned list. The resolution also 
requested that States include the measures imposed on those individuals and 
entities on the list and that they inform the Committee of the listing and 
delisting procedures. The resolution also mandated coordination between the 
Resolution 1267 Committee, the CTC, and another Committee created by 
Resolution 1540. See S.C. Res. 1617 (July 29, 2005). Resolution 1540 established 
a Security Council committee tasked with implementing the said resolution, 
which seeks to prevent non-State actors from developing, acquiring, 
manufacturing, possessing, transporting, or using chemical or biological 
weapons. See S.C. Res. 1540 (Apr. 28, 2004). 
 100. Resolution 1624 dealt with incitement to terrorism through the use of 
communications. It recalled members’ obligation to deny safe haven and to 
bring to justice those individuals who, among others, support and participate in 
the various stages of terrorist attacks. Resolution 1624 required States to enact 
legislation aimed at prohibiting incitement to carry out terrorist attacks, at 
preventing such incitement, and at denying protection to those guilty of such 
conduct. The resolution also obliged States to report to the CTC all the steps 
they had taken in this direction. See S.C. Res. 1624 (Sept. 14, 2005). 
 101. Resolution 1625 recognized the need for partnerships with African 
organizations to offer early responses to disputes. S.C. Res. 1625 (Sept. 14, 
2005). 
 102. S.C. Res. 1611 (July 7, 2005). 
 103. S.C. Res. 1618 (Aug. 4, 2005). 
 104. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/64 (Dec. 21, 2005); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2005/3 (Jan. 18, 2005). 
 105. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/55 (Nov. 10, 2005); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2005/53 (Oct. 31, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/45 (Oct. 4, 2005); 
2017] FROM AL-QAIDA IN 2001 TO ISIL IN 2015 371 
press issued by the members of the Council dealing with 
terrorism in 2005, condemning the July 7 attack in London.106 
5. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2006 
In 2006 the Security Council adopted only one resolution, a 
Chapter VII decision, related to terrorism: Resolution 1735. 
Deep improvements to multilateral instruments to face 
terrorism were put in place by this resolution.107 Furthermore, 
there were two presidential statements in 2006, following 
terrorist attacks in Egypt and India, respectively.108 Finally, 
there was no reference to practice related to terrorism in press 
statements in 2006.109 
6. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2007 
Only one resolution dealing with threats to international 
peace provoked by terrorism was adopted by the Council in 2007: 
Resolution 1787. It reminded States of the need to comply with 
international law when combating terrorism, and commended 
States for cooperating with the CTC.110 In addition, the Council 
issued eight other presidential statements in 2007 in response 
to terrorism attacks,111 and highlighted in another its 
 
U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/37 (July 27, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C., 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/36 
(July 27, 2005); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/29 (July 8, 2005). 
 106. Press Release, Security Council, Press Statement on London Terrorist 
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/8439 (July 7, 2005). 
 107. Resolution 1735 confirmed the set of measures established by prior 
resolutions and improved the listing and delisting process in terms of the 
quality and nature of the information that must be provided by designating 
members and the information that could be made public to interested States. 
Resolution 1735 directed the Resolution 1267 Committee to identify causes of 
non-compliance and to report to the Council on this matter. See S.C. Res. 1735 
(Dec. 22, 2006). 
 108. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2006/30 (July 12, 2006); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2006/18 (Apr. 25, 2006). 
 109. See Press Statements, U.N. SEC. COUNCIL, https://www.un.org/en/sc/
documents/press/2006.shtml (listing press statements made by the President of 
the Security Council in 2006) (last visited Feb. 21, 2017). 
 110. S.C. Res. 1787 (Dec. 10, 2007). 
 111. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
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willingness to work together with the UN Secretary General to 
address “the multifaceted and interconnected challenges and 
threats confronting our world.”112 Lastly, the members of the 
Council issued three press statements in 2007 as a result of 
terrorist attacks in India, Iraq, and Afghanistan.113 
7. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2008 
In 2008 the Council issued two resolutions in order to 
improve multilateral instruments—the Resolution 1267 
Committee and the CTC—to face terrorist threats: Resolution 
1805114 and Resolution 1922, a Chapter VII decision.115 In 
 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/50 (Dec. 27, 2007); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2007/45 (Dec. 11, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/39 (Oct. 22, 2007); 
U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/36 (Oct. 5, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement 
by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/32 (Sept. 7, 
2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/26 (July 9, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., 
Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/11 
(Apr. 13, 2007); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/ 2007/10 (Apr. 12, 2007). 
 112. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2007/1 (Jan. 8, 2008). 
 113. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Condemns Attack 
on Military Bus in Kabul, U.N. Press Release SC/9162 (Nov. 5, 2007); see also 
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Baghdad 
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/8974 (Mar. 22, 2007); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Bombing of Delhi-Lahore Train, 
U.N. Press Release SC/8961 (Feb. 20, 2007). 
 114. Resolution 1805 urged the Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive 
Directorate (“CTED”) to increase members’ counter-terrorism capabilities, and 
stressed the need for a close dialogue between members, the CTC, and the 
CTED. See S.C. Res. 1805 (Mar. 20, 2008). 
 115. In response to challenges before national courts to measures taken on 
the basis of counter-terrorism resolutions, Resolution 1822 recognized the need 
for a fair and clear process for the inclusion of individuals and entities within 
the consolidated list pursuant to Resolutions 1267 and 1333 (the “Consolidated 
List”). The resolution improved the listing and delisting procedures by 
increasing transparency. It directed the Resolution 1267 Committee to make 
accessible on its website a summary of the reasons for listing individuals or 
entities. Also, the resolution demanded that notified States take all possible 
measures to inform the listed individual or entity of the designation, its reasons, 
effects, and the Committee’s procedures for assessing delisting requests. The 
resolution also welcomed the creation of a Focal Point that allowed listed 
individuals and entities to directly request delisting. See S.C. Res. 1822 (June 
30, 2008). 
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addition, the Council made four presidential statements 
condemning terrorist attacks in Pakistan and Algeria.116 Lastly, 
the members of the Council issued eight press statements 
censuring terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkey, 
Spain, Syria, and India.117 
8. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2009 
The Security Council enacted only one resolution in 2009, 
Resolution 1904, a Chapter VII decision aimed again at 
improving a multilateral tool, the Resolution 1267 Committee.118 
The Council made only one presidential statement in 2009, in 
the aftermath of a terrorist attack in Indonesia.119 Lastly, the 
 
 116. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/35 (Sept. 22, 2008); see also U.N. 
President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. 
Doc. S/PRST/2008/32 (Aug. 21, 2008); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by 
the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/31 (Aug. 19, 
2008); U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2008/19 (June 2, 2008). 
 117. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Terrorist Attacks in Mumbai, U.N. Press Release SC/9513 (Nov. 28, 2008); 
see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Damascus Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9460 (Sept. 27, 2008); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attacks in Spain, U.N. Press Release SC/9455 (Sept. 24, 2008); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in 
Turkey, U.N. Press Release SC/9394 (July 10, 2008); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Pakistan, 
U.N. Press Release SC/9389 (July 8, 2008); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Kabul Bomb Attack, U.N. Press Release 
SC/9386 (July 7, 2008); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on Kandahar Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9251 (Feb. 17, 
2008); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Kabul Hotel Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/9226 (Jan. 15, 2008). 
 118. Resolution 1904 reaffirmed the traditional measures and their 
exemptions for humanitarian reasons. The most important development the 
resolution contained was the creation of an independent Office of the 
Ombudsperson, which would assist the Resolution 1267 Committee in dealing 
with delisting requests made by individuals. The resolution also dealt with the 
review and maintenance of the Consolidated List by encouraging members to 
provide the Committee with additional information on listed persons and 
entities related to operating status, incarceration, movement, and death, among 
others. The resolution also requested the Monitoring Team to identify the listed 
individuals and entities whose information was not enough to ensure 
implementation of the measures imposed upon them. See S.C. Res. 1904 (Dec. 
17, 2009). 
 119. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2009/22 (July 17, 2009). 
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members of the Council issued five press statements after 
terrorist attacks in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.120 
9. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2010 
Resolution 1963 was the only resolution adopted by the 
Council on threats to international peace provoked by terrorism 
in 2010 and, again, was aimed at developing a multilateral tool, 
the CTC, to cope with this threat.121 As to presidential 
statements, the Council issued two. The statement of February 
24 dealt with the connection between drug trafficking and 
terrorism and called for international and regional cooperation 
and for States to prosecute persons responsible for organized 
crime, terrorism, and corruption.122 The second statement, on 
September 27, mainly addressed issues of compliance with 
previous resolutions, cooperation between UN members, and 
with the operation of the CTC.123 Finally, the members of the 
Security Council issued seven statements related to terrorism in 
response to terrorist attacks in Russia, Uganda, Iran, Nigeria, 
Afghanistan, and Iraq.124 
 
 120. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Terrorist Attack in Iran, U.N. Press Release SC/9770 (Oct. 20, 2009); see also 
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on the Kabul 
Bomb Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/9763 (Oct. 8, 2009); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in 
Kandahar, U.N. Press Release SC/9735 (Aug. 26, 2009); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Baghdad Bombings, U.N. Press 
Release SC/9733 (Aug. 19, 2009); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Kabul, U.N. Press Release 
SC/9593 (Feb. 11, 2009). 
 121. Resolution 1963 contained some decisions regarding the operation of 
the CTC and the CTED in terms of the developing of States’ capabilities to 
combat terrorism. The resolution also reminded members that counter-
terrorism measures and respect for human rights were complementary and 
reinforced each other. See S.C. Res. 1963 (Dec. 20, 2010). 
 122. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/4 (Feb. 24, 2010). 
 123. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/19 (Sept. 27, 2010). 
 124. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Violence in Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/10081 (Nov. 10, 2010); see also Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attack in Herat, U.N. Press Release SC/10070 (Oct. 25, 2010); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Abuja Bombings, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10048 (Oct. 4, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Deadly Vladikavkz Bombing, U.N. Press Release 
SC/10025 (Sept. 13, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
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10. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2011 
The Security Council enacted two resolutions in 2011 
regarding terrorism: Resolutions 1988125 and 1989, 126 both 
Chapter VII decisions creating and improving multilateral 
instruments to overcome terrorist threats. The Council issued 
two presidential statements in this domain. The first 
presidential statement was issued on February 11 and 
addressed the interdependence between security and 
 
Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Iran, U.N. Press Release SC/9986 (July 
16, 2010); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Kampala Bombings, U.N. Press Release SC/9980 (July 12, 2010); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Deadly Moscow 
Bombings, U.N. Press Release SC/9895 (Mar. 29, 2010). 
 125. Resolution 1988 reaffirmed the measures against the Taliban and 
created a separate sanction regime for the group, whose members or associates 
were to be included within a particular list and no longer the Consolidated List 
created by Resolutions 1267 and 1333. The resolution also created a new 
Sanctions Committee, consisting of all the members of the Council, and decided 
that the acts or activities that could make a person or entity eligible for 
designation were the participation in the various stages of terrorist acts, such 
as the supply of arms and related material, and recruitment. The resolution 
also decided that all members had to apply the available exemptions set forth 
in Resolutions 1452 and 1735 to the measures already mentioned. Resolution 
1988 directed its Committee to make accessible on its website a narrative 
summary of the reasons for the listing. As to delisting procedures, Resolution 
1988 ordered the Committee to remove names of those individuals who had 
renounced terrorism and any membership in terrorist entities, and it also made 
it possible for individuals and entities to request delisting without members’ 
support by submitting such request to the Focal Point created by Resolution 
173. See S.C. Res. 1988, ¶ 1 (June 17, 2011). 
 126. Resolution 1989 adjusted the Resolution 1267 Committee’s mandate to 
the changes introduced by Resolution 1988 and to the Committee established 
therein, while preserving the measures against Al-Qaida and its members, the 
requirements of listing requests by UN States, and the procedure to follow after 
listing names. The resolution also determined that the Ombudsperson had to 
present to the Committee recommendations regarding the delisting request the 
office had received and determined the procedure to be followed. It also stated 
that, when the designating State requested a delisting, members would 
terminate the measures against the given person or entity 60 days after the 
request, unless the Committee decided by consensus to keep the listing. In the 
absence of consensus, the Security Council would make the decision within 60 
days. The resolution reaffirmed the existing notification procedure of 
nationality, location, or incorporation of any delisting to UN members and to 
the individuals and entities themselves. In terms of the review and 
maintenance of the Al-Qaida Sanctions List, Resolution 1989 requested periodic 
updates. As to measure-implementation procedures, Resolution 1989 urged 
States to implement the standards embodied in the Financial Action Task Force 
(“FATF”) Recommendations and the FATF Special Recommendations on 
Terrorist Financing. See S.C. Res. 1989 (June 17, 2011). 
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development.127 The second presidential statement was issued 
on the day of the death of Osama Bin Laden, May 2, 2011. The 
Council stated: 
The Security Council stresses that no cause or grievance 
can justify the murder of innocent people and that 
terrorism will not be defeated by military force, law 
enforcement measures, and intelligence operations 
alone, and can only be defeated by a sustained and 
comprehensive approach involving the active 
participation and collaboration of all States and relevant 
international and regional organizations and civil society 
to address the conditions conducive to the spread of 
terrorism and to impede, impair, isolate and incapacitate 
the terrorist threat.128 
The death of Bin Laden gave the Council the opportunity to refer 
in some way to the right to self-defense once again. It is telling 
that, instead, the Council emphasized only the multilateral 
character of the fight against terrorism. 
Also worth noting is the fact that the tenth anniversary of 
the 9/11 attacks came and went without the Council’s 
mentioning the right to self-defense. The press statement issued 
by the Council on September 11, 2011, made no reference to this 
right as an important means to face threats to international 
peace and security posed by terrorism. Instead, the members 
gave significant emphasis to the multinational dimension of the 
effort by stating: 
The members of the Security Council noted that in the 
period after the 11 September 2001 attacks, States 
joined together in a spirit of cooperation to combat 
terrorism, including through diplomatic efforts at and 
with the United Nations, and that such cooperation is 
essential and should be further strengthened.129 
 
 127. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/4 (Feb. 11, 2011). 
 128. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2011/9, ¶ 9 (May 2, 2011). 
 129. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Tenth Anniversary of 11 September 2001, U.N. Press Release SC/10378, ¶ 4 
(Sept. 9, 2011) [hereinafter Press Statement on Tenth Anniversary of 11 
September 2001]. 
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Finally, the members of the Council issued nine other 
statements related to terrorism during 2011, condemning 
terrorist attacks in Russia, Belarus, Norway, India, Syria, and 
Nigeria.130 
11. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2012 
Two resolutions on threats to international peace prompted 
by terrorism were made by the Council in 2012: Resolution 
2082131 and Resolution 2083.132 Both were Chapter VII decisions 
 
 130. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10507 (Dec. 27, 2011); 
see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Terrorist Attack in Damascus, Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10506 (Dec. 23, 
2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Terrorist Attack in India, U.N. Press Release SC/10377 (Sept. 7, 2011); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Abuja Bombing, 
U.N. Press Release SC/10370 (Aug. 26, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Norway, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10337 (July 25, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Attacks in Mumbai, India, U.N. Press Release 
SC/10325 (July 13, 2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Minsk Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10225 (Apr. 13, 
2011); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Deadly Moscow Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10162 (Jan. 24, 2011). 
 131. Resolution 2082 defined the assets that could be frozen, and reiterated 
when an entity was associated with the Taliban and could, therefore, be listed 
by the Resolution 1988 Committee. The resolution also exempted from the 
travel ban, under certain conditions, those listed individuals participating in 
the Afghan reconciliation process. As to listing procedures, Resolution 2082 
improved them by urging members to consult with the Afghan government 
before making listing requests to the Committee. As to delisting procedures, 
Resolution 2082 followed Resolution 1988 in general terms and mandated 
expeditious removal of individuals and entities that no longer met the criteria 
or had renounced terrorism. See S.C. Res. 2082 (Dec. 17, 2012). 
 132. Resolution 2083 reaffirmed the existing measures against Al Qaida, its 
members, and associated entities and the information requirements regarding 
them, the notification procedure for States and listed individuals and entities, 
and the information disclosure requirements. As to delisting, the resolution also 
reaffirmed the existing procedure and time-frame when it was the designating 
State who requested delisting to the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee. The 
resolution also directed the Committee to provide reasons for objections to 
delisting requests, confirmed prior notification procedures of delisting decisions, 
and introduced adjustments to exemptions procedures. As to the Review and 
Maintenance of the Al Qaeda Sanctions List, Resolution 2083 was in line with 
prior resolutions, in particular regarding deceased listed individuals. As to 
measures implementation, the resolution reaffirmed members’ obligation to 
identify or introduce procedures to implement the sanctions against listed 
individuals and urged States to implement the Financial Action Task Force’s 
recommendations on combating money laundering and the financing of 
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and multilateral in character, calling for strengthening the 
Resolution 1988 Committee and the CTC. In terms of 
presidential statements, the Security Council issued one on May 
4, 2012, in which it referenced several dimensions of its strategy 
to deal with terrorist threats.133 For their part, the members of 
the Security Council issued 12 statements related to terrorism 
in 2012. Condemnation was made after terrorist attacks in 
Syria, Nigeria, Yemen, Bulgaria, Iraq, Somalia, and Lebanon.134 
12. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2013 
The Council enacted one resolution in 2013, Resolution 
2129, dealing again with different dimensions of the CTC to cope 
with terrorist threats.135 The Council issued only one 
presidential statement, which was the result of an open debate 
 
terrorism. See S.C. Res. 2083 (Dec. 17, 2012). 
 133. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2012/17 (May 4, 2012). 
 134. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/10799 (Oct. 19, 2012); see also Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attacks in Aleppo, U.N. Press Release SC/10784 (Oct. 5, 2012); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in 
Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/10774 (Sept. 21, 2012); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10762 (Sept. 13, 2012); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Iraq, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10757 (Sept. 11 2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Bulgaria, U.N. Press Release 
SC/10717 (July 19, 2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Attacks in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10658 (May 27, 
2012); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/10656 (May 21, 2012); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attacks in Damascus, U.N. Press Release SC/10643 (May 10, 2012); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attacks in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/10585 (Mar. 21, 2012); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in 
Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10530 (Jan. 26, 2012); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Damascus Terrorist Attack, U.N. 
Press Release SC/10513 (Jan. 6, 2012). 
 135. Resolution 2129 invited the CTED to cooperate with UN members and 
regional and sub-regional organizations on the formulation of counterterrorism 
strategies to implement Resolutions 1373 and 1624. The Resolution invited the 
CTDE to engage in partnerships with civil society and international 
organizations, in consultation with given members, in order to prevent the 
spread of terrorism, and also stressed the importance of tailored dialogues 
among the CTC, the CTDE, and members. See S.C. Res. 2129 (Dec. 17, 2013). 
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held on a comprehensive response to counter-terrorism. 136 
Lastly, the members of the Council issued 26 press statements 
after terrorist attacks in Algeria, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, 
Libya, Turkey, Niger, Lebanon, Kenya, Iraq, Yemen, Mali, and 
Russia. In these statements the Council reaffirmed the need to 
bring perpetrators to justice and called upon States to cooperate 
to this end.137 
 
 136. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2013/1, ¶¶ 2, 4, 8 (Jan. 15, 2013). 
 137. See Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement 
on Second Terrorist Attack in Russian Federation, U.N. Press Release SC/11234 
(Dec. 30, 2013); see also Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on Terrorist Attack in Russian Federation, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11233 (Dec. 29, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Lebanon Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11232 
(Dec. 27, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on Terrorist Attack in Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11214 (Dec. 14, 
2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Attack Against Defense Ministry of Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11202 (Dec. 
5, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Attacks in Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11199 (Dec. 4, 2013); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Violence in 
Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/11186 (Nov. 25, 2013); Press Release, Security 
Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11180 (Nov. 19, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Bomb Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11170 (Nov. 9, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Attack in Nairobi, U.N. Press Release SC/11129 
(Sept. 21, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on 13 September Attack Against United States Consulate in 
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11122 (Sept. 13, 2013); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in 
Tripoli, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11101 (Aug. 23, 2013); Press Release, 
Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Lebanon, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11095 (Aug. 15, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on 3 August Attack in Afghanistan, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11086 (Aug. 5, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
Council Press Statement on Attack Against Turkish Embassy in Somalia, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11080 (July 29, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11055 
(July 9, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press 
Statement on Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11030 (June 11, 2013); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Afghanistan, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11016 (May 26, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, 
Security Council Press Statement on Attacks in Niger, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11014 (May 24, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Deadly Attack in Benghazi, Libya, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11008 (May 13, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Reyhanli, Turkey, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11006 (May 13, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Attack Against French Embassy in Libya, U.N. Press 
Release SC/10984 (Apr. 23, 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security 
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13. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2014 
In 2014 the Security Council adopted five resolutions 
related to terrorism: Resolutions 2133,138 2160,139 2161,140 
2170,141 and 2178.142 Resolutions 2160, 2161, 2170, and 2178 are 
Chapter VII decisions. All are aimed at improving or expanding 
the scope of multilateral tools—the Resolutions 1267/1889 
Committee, the CTC, and the Resolution 1988 Committee—to 
respond to the emergence of ISIL and the ANF. 
Resolution 2170 reiterates that terrorism is one of the most 
serious threats to international peace and security and strongly 
condemns ISIL’s actions, but does not mention the right to self-
defense.143 The Council’s response to ISIL in Resolution 2178 
 
Council Press Statement on Terrorist Attacks in Somalia, U.N. Press Release 
SC/10972 (Apr. 15 2013); Press Release, Security Council, Security Council 
Press Statement on Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/10967 (Apr. 4, 2013); 
Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on 
Damascus Bombing, U.N. Press Release SC/10953 (Mar. 22, 2013); Press 
Release, Security Council, Security Council Press Statement on Terrorist 
Attack in Amenas, Algeria, U.N. Press Release SC/10887 (Jan. 18, 2013). 
 138. Resolution 2133 attempts to prevent kidnapping by terrorist 
organizations by seeking to reduce organizations’ access to funding and 
financial services. It calls upon States to cooperate during events of kidnapping 
by terrorist groups and encourages the Monitoring Team of the Resolutions 
1267/1989 Committee and the Resolution 1988 Committee to cooperate when 
furnishing information on trends and developments in this domain. See S.C. 
Res. 2133 (Jan. 27, 2014). 
 139. Resolution 2160 deals with the threats that the Taliban and Al-Qaida 
pose to Afghanistan. It keeps the fine tuning of the operation of the Resolution 
1988 Committee in term of supporting information for the listing of entities and 
individuals, de-listing procedures, and compliance with the Resolution, among 
other issues. See S.C. Res. 2160 (June 17, 2014). 
 140. In addition to the traditional provisions on measures against Al-Qaida 
and associated entities or individuals and exemptions, Resolution 2161 urges 
States to implement the standards contemplated in the Financial Action Task 
Force’s Forty Recommendations on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism and Proliferation. Further, the resolution continues to 
refine listing procedures for the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee in terms of 
quality, transparency, inter-state cooperation, timely notification to listed 
individuals, de-listing requests and procedures, the duties and responsibilities 
of the Ombudsperson and the general structure of delisting procedure, the 
maintenance of the list in order to remove these listings if they are no longer 
appropriate. Finally, Resolution 2161 also directs the Resolutions 1267/1989 
Committee to cooperate with the Resolution 1988 Committee, the CTC, and the 
Resolution 1540 Committee. See S.C. Res. 2161 (June 17, 2014). 
 141. See S.C. Res. 2170 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
 142. See S.C. Res. 2178 (Sept. 24, 2014). 
 143. Resolution 2170 explicitly provides for the measures contemplated by 
Resolution 2161 (2014) to be applied to ISIL and ANF as well. S.C. Res. 2170, ¶ 
2017] FROM AL-QAIDA IN 2001 TO ISIL IN 2015 381 
remains focused on the multilateral dimension. The Council 
reaffirms “its respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity 
and political independence of all States in accordance with the 
Charter”144 and notes the “recent developments and initiatives 
at the international, regional and sub-regional levels to prevent 
and suppress international terrorism.”145 The focus of the 
resolution is the multinational effort to address the issue of 
foreign terrorist fighters who pose a risk to their state of origin 
and the states to which they travel.146 
 
5, (Aug. 15, 2014). The resolution urges States to cooperate in order to bring to 
justice ISIL and ANF members and associated entities or undertakings. Id. It 
reaffirms that States must prevent the direct or indirect supply of arms and 
related material of all kinds to ISIL and ANF and ensure that no funds are 
made available to them by persons or entities within their territories. Id. ¶ 10. 
Resolution 2170 also notes that ISIL and ANF have gained control of oilfields, 
and the Council reiterates that engaging in trade with the organizations 
constitutes financial support for entities designated by the Resolutions 
1267/1989 Committee and leads to additional listings. Id. ¶ 13. Finally, 
Resolution 2170 expresses that individuals, groups, and entities giving support 
to ISIL and ANF can be included on the Al-Qaida sanctions list, and it identifies 
a set of individuals that shall be the subject of the measures provided for in 
Resolution 2161. Id. ¶ 18. Resolution 2170 also directs the Monitoring Team to 
report to the said Committee on the threat, resources, and funding of ISIL and 
ANF within 90 days. Id. ¶ 22. Resolution 2170 explicitly provides for the 
measures contemplated by Resolution 2161 (2014) to be applied to ISIL and 
ANF as well. The resolution urges States to cooperate in order to bring to justice 
ISIL and ANF members and associated entities or undertakings. It reaffirms 
that States must prevent the direct or indirect supply of arms and related 
material of all kinds to ISIL and ANF and ensure that no funds are made 
available to them by persons or entities within their territories. Resolution 2170 
also notes that ISIL and ANF have gained control of oilfields, and the Council 
reiterates that engaging in trade with the organizations constitutes financial 
support for entities designated by the Resolutions 1267/1989 Committee and 
leads to additional listings. Finally, Resolution 2170 expresses that individuals, 
groups, and entities giving support to ISIL and ANF can be included on the Al-
Qaida sanctions list, and it identifies a set of individuals that shall be the 
subject of the measures provided for in Resolution 2161. Resolution 2170 also 
directs the Monitoring Team to report to the said Committee on the threat, 
resources, and funding of ISIL and ANF within 90 days. See S.C. Res. 2170 
(Aug. 15, 2014). 
 144. S.C. Res. 2178, pmbl. ¶ 6 (Aug. 15, 2014). 
 145. Id. pmbl. ¶ 17. 
 146. The Council reaffirms in Resolution 2178 that States must prevent the 
movement of terrorists by effective border controls and urges States to intensify 
the exchange of information regarding actions or movements of foreign terrorist 
fighters. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, ¶ 2. Resolution 2178 also decides that 
States must prevent financial support for these fighters and implement 
prosecution and reintegration strategies for those who return to their countries 
of origin. Id. ¶ 4. The Resolution also decides that all States must ensure that 
their legislation establishes serious criminal offenses sufficient to prosecute and 
penalize nationals who travel or attempt to travel to other States for the 
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The Council issued four presidential statements related to 
terrorism in 2014. In its first statement, on January 10, the 
Council condemned the attacks in Iraq carried out by ISIL and 
reaffirmed past practice calling on States to cooperate in order 
to bring to justice the perpetrators and to comply with 
international law when adopting measures aimed at combatting 
terrorism. Importantly, the Council calls for unity between 
different segments of Iraqi society to face the threat, without 
framing the situation within the contours of self-defense.147 The 
Council issued the second presidential statement on July 28, 
2014, which also dealt with the threats posed by ISIL and ANF. 
The statement starts by reaffirming past resolutions, including 
Resolution 1373, and underscores that trading in oil with these 
organizations is a violation of the Council’s resolutions.148 
The third presidential statement took place on September 
19, 2014, and in it, the Council condemns what it calls a large-
scale offensive by ISIL and associated groups against Iraq, 
which posed a major threat to the region. The Council also urges 
the international community to support Iraq in its fight against 
ISIL and stresses that terrorism can be defeated only by a 
comprehensive approach involving the active participation of all 
parties.149 The fourth presidential statement was made by the 
Council on November 19, once again in response to the situation 
created by ISIL and ANF in Syria and Iraq.150 It closely follows 
the four resolutions adopted in 2014 and urges States to take 
prompt action. 
The Council also issued 40 terrorism-related press 
statements in 2014. The statements were made in response to 
terrorist attacks in Lebanon, Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, 
 
purpose of participating at various stages of terrorist attacks and for the 
provision of funds in any way with knowledge that they will be used to finance 
the travel of foreign terrorist fighters. Id. ¶ 6. Resolution 2178 also orders States 
to deny entry or transit of any individual that might be considered to be doing 
so for the purpose of the said criminal offenses. Id. ¶ 8. It also calls upon 
members to improve cooperation at all levels to prevent the travel of foreign 
terrorist fighters and emphasizes that they could be eligible for inclusion on the 
Al-Qaida Sanctions list. Id. ¶ 11. 
 147. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/1 (Jan. 10, 2014). 
 148. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/14 (July 28, 2014). 
 149. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/20 (Sept. 19, 2014). 
 150. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2014/23 (Nov. 19, 2014). 
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Yemen, Nigeria, Algeria, Belgium, Iraq, Libya, Greece, and 
Mali.151 
 
 151. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11721-AFR/3047-PKO/460 (Dec. 26, 2014); 
Press Release, Security Council, Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11710 (Dec. 17, 
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Peshawar, Pakistan, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11707 (Dec. 16, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Attack against Israeli Embassy in Athens, U.N. Press Release SC/11700 (Dec. 
13, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Kabul Attack, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11695-AFG/433 (Dec. 11, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Yemen, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11683 (Dec. 4, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11710 (Dec. 3, 2014); 
Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Kabul, Afghanistan, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11678-AFG/432 (Nov. 27, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11664-AFG/431 (Nov. 24, 2014); Press 
Release, Security Council, ISIL Killings, U.N. Press Release SC/11654 (Nov. 18, 
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks in Tripoli, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11646-AFR/3015 (Nov. 13, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Suicide Bomb Attack against Government Science Technical School in 
Potiskum in Yobe State, Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11639-AFR/3014 (Nov. 
10, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Iraq, U.N. Press Release SC/11625-
IK/694 (Oct. 31, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks by 
ISIL, U.N. Press Release SC/11605-IK/693 (Oct. 17, 2014); Press Release, 
Security Council, Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11595 (Oct. 10, 2014); Press 
Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks on School in Homs, Syria, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11589 (Oct. 3, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of 
Alan Henning, U.N. Press Release SC/11590 (Oct. 3, 2014); Press Release, 
Security Council, Murder of Hervé Gourdel, U.N. Press Release SC/11581 (Sept. 
24, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11568-
AFR/2970-PKO/439 (Sept. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Afghanistan Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11431-AFG/417 (June 6, 2014); 
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Belgium, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11418 (May 28, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Afghanistan 
Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11411-AFG/416 (May 23, 2014); Press Release, 
Security Council, Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11387-AFR/2882 
(May 9, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Yemen, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11381 (May 5, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11380-AFR/2877 (May 4, 
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Algeria, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11364-AFR/2872 (Apr. 24, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, 
Terrorist Attacks in Nigeria, U.N. Press Release SC/11352-AFR/2861 (Apr. 14, 
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Yemen, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11336 (Mar. 25, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11334-AFG/408 (Mar. 21, 2014); Press 
Release, Security Council, Attack on Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11331-
AFR/2840 (Mar. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/11324-AFG/407 (Mar. 18, 2014); Press 
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11300-AFR/2831 (Feb. 27, 2014); Press Statement, Security Council, 
Terrorist Attack in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11291-AFR/2823 (Feb. 21, 
2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11287 (Feb. 19, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Lebanon, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11269 (Feb. 1, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Deadly 
384 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
14. The Security Council and Terrorism in 2015 
In 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, the Council adopted two 
resolutions under Chapter VII. Resolution 2199 continues with 
the design and use of multilateral tools, such as the Resolutions 
1267/1989 Committee, to face the threat to international peace 
and security caused by ISIL.152 Resolution 2214 also deals with 
multilateral tools, the above-mentioned Committee, and is 
aimed at combating terrorist actions by Al-Qaida, ISIL, and a 
new group, Ansar Al Charia, in Libya.153 The Council also issued 
three presidential statements before November 2015. Two 
condemn attacks perpetrated by Boko Haram and highlight the 
regional efforts to combat this entity,154 while the third deals 
again with ISIL and foreign fighters with calls for wide 
implementation of Resolution 2178 (2014) by UN members.155 
Lastly, the members of the Council made 41 statements to 
the press from January to November 2015, all of which condemn 
terrorist attacks in France, Yemen, Lebanon, Syria, Libya, 
Egypt, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Somalia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Afghanistan, and Mali, and reaffirm past pronouncements on 
international cooperation and justice for perpetrators.156 
 
Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11256 (Jan. 21, 2014); 
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Kabul, U.N. Press Release 
SC/11251-AFG/405 (Jan. 17, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11250-L/3224 (Jan. 16, 2014); 
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Lebanon, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11249 (Jan. 16, 2014); Press Release, Security Council, Attack in 
Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11239 (Jan. 2, 2014); Press Release, Security 
Council, Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11240-AFR/2789 (Jan. 2, 2014). 
 152. Resolution 2199 contains measures on oil trade, cultural heritage, 
banking, arms and related material, and asset freeze aimed at striking at ISIL’s 
financial resources. See S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58. 
 153. In particular, Resolution 2214 encourages UN Member States to 
“submit listing requests to the Committee established pursuant to resolutions 
1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) . . . of individuals and entities supporting ISIL, 
Ansar Al Charia,” and Al-Qaida in Libya. S.C. Res. 2214, ¶ 4 (Mar. 27, 2015). 
This resolution has not been included as a decision related to threats to 
international peace and security caused by terrorist acts, but its connection with 
the topic is significant. 
 154. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2015/4 (Jan. 19, 2015); U.N. President of 
the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2015/14 (July 28, 2015). 
 155. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2015/11 (May 29, 2015). 
 156. See generally Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Bamako, U.N. Press Release SC/12133-AFR/3268 (Nov. 20, 2015); Press 
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Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in Lebanon, U.N. Press Release 
SC/12120 (Nov. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Paris, U.N. Press Release SC/12121 (Nov. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attacks by Boko Haram, U.N. Press Release SC/12075-
AFR/3242 (Oct. 12, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Eid Bombings in 
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/12056 (Sept. 24, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attacks in Afghanistan, U.N. Press Release SC/12003-
AFG/442 (Aug. 9, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in 
Saudi Arabia, U.N. Press Release SC/12000 (Aug. 6, 2015); Press Release, 
Security Council, Attacks in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11981-
AFR/3186 (July 27, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in 
Suruç, Turkey, U.N. Press Release SC/11979 (July 22, 2015); Press Release, 
Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11959-
AFR/3173-PKO/505 (July 2, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Al-Shabaab 
Attacks in Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11949-AFR/3166-PKO/501 (June 27, 
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attacks in France, Kuwait, 
Tunisia, U.N. Press Release SC/11947 (June 26, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Al-Shabaab Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11945-
AFR/3162 (June 25, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in 
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11935 (June 18, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attack in N’Djamena, Chad, U.N. Press Release SC/11927-
AFR/3157 (June 15, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Attacks against 
Civilians in Syria, U.N. Press Release SC/11921 (June 5, 2015); Press Release, 
Security Council, Al-Shabaab Attack against UNICEF in Garowe, Somalia, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11866-AFR/3117 (Apr. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, Somalia, U.N. Press Release SC/11863-
AFR/3113 (Apr. 15, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Attacks in Tripoli, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11861-AFR/3112 (Apr. 14, 2015); Press Release Security 
Council, Mali, U.N. Press Release SC/11855-AFR/3108 (Apr. 10, 2015); Press 
Release, Security Council, Al-Shabaab Attack in Garissa, Kenya, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11850-AFR/3104 (Apr. 3, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, 
Terrorist Attack in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11844-AFR/3099 (Mar. 
28, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attacks in Yemen, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11827 (Mar. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist 
Attack in Tunisia, U.N. Press Release SC/11823-AFR/3097 (Mar. 18, 2015); 
Press Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Kidal, Mali, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11812-AFR/3092-PKO/472 (Mar. 8, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attack in Bamako, U.N. Press Release SC/11811-AFR/3090 
(Mar. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, ISIL’s Destruction of Religious 
and Cultural Artefacts in Mosul, U.N. Press Release SC/11804-IK/700 (Feb. 27, 
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Bomb Attack in al-Qubbah, Libya, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11792-AFR/3084 (Feb. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Terrorist Attacks in Mogadishu, U.N. Press Release SC/11791-
AFR/3083 (Feb. 20, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of 21 
Egyptians, U.N. Press Release SC/11782-AFR/3078 (Feb. 15, 2015); Press 
Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks in Cameroon, Chad and Niger, 
U.N. Press Release SC/11780-AFR/3077 (Feb. 13, 2015); Press Release, Security 
Council, Murder of Muath Al-Kasasbeh, U.N. Press Release SC/11764 (Feb. 3, 
2015); Press Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks in Nigeria and 
against Chadian Troops in Cameroon, U.N. Press Release SC/11763-AFR/3068 
(Feb. 2, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of Kenji Goto, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11762-PI/2111 (Feb. 1, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, 
Sinai Terrorist Attack, U.N. Press Release SC/11761 (Jan. 30, 2015); Press 
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack in Libya, U.N. Press Release 
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B. SUMMARY OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS AND 
PRACTICES FROM 2002 TO NOVEMBER 2015, BEFORE 
RESOLUTION 2249 
1. Multilateralism as the First Guiding Principle in the 
Fight Against Terrorist Threats 
The Security Council’s decisions and practices related to 
terrorism prior to Resolution 2249 involved multilateral tools 
unrelated to the use of force—tools which the Council focused on, 
devised, refined, and expanded.157 The council advanced these 
objectives in several ways. The reality was matched by the 
Council’s intention, clearly expressed in several decisions. Early 
in 2003, for example, the Council expressed in Resolution 1456 
that: 
[T]errorism can only be defeated, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations and international law, by 
a sustained comprehensive approach involving the active 
participation and collaboration of all States, 
international and regional organizations, and by 
redoubled efforts at the national level.158 
This statement was reaffirmed several times over the next 
decade, such as in Resolution 1735 (2006), a Chapter VII 
decision, as well as in Resolution 1904 (2009), Resolution 1989 
(2011), Resolution 2161 (2014), Resolution 2170 (2014); and 
Resolution 2199 (2015). Furthermore, the members of the 
Council, on the 10-year anniversary of 9/11, declared: 
[I]n the period after the 11 September 2001 attacks, 
States joined together in a spirit of cooperation to combat 
terrorism, including through diplomatic efforts at and 
 
SC/11754-AFR/3060 (Jan. 27, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, Murder of 
Haruna Yukawa, U.N. Press Release SC/11752 (Jan. 25, 2015); Press Release, 
Security Council, Lebanon, U.N. Press Release SC/11731 (Jan. 11, 2015); Press 
Release, Security Council, Terrorist Attack on French Newspaper, U.N. Press 
Release SC/11727-PI/2109 (Jan. 7, 2015); Press Release, Security Council, 
Yemen, U.N. Press Release SC/11728 (Jan. 7, 2015). 
 157. Another strategy the Security Council employed prior to Resolution 
2249, discussed below in Part IX, was the creation of a particular standard of 
attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions. 
 158. S.C. Res. 1456, supra note 88, ¶ 2. 
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with the United Nations, and that such cooperation is 
essential and should be further strengthened.159 
2. No Explicit Subsequent Security Council Decision and 
Practice Related to the Right to Self-Defense Against 
Autonomous Non-State Actors Between 2002 and 2015, 
Before Resolution 2249 
The initial post-9/11 decisions and practices of the Security 
Council, specifically Resolutions 1368 (2001) and 1373 (2001), 
related to the right of self-defense in response to terrorist 
attacks. From 2002 to 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, the 
Security Council adopted 36 resolutions, 20 under Chapter VII, 
issued 48 presidential statements, and made 156 press 
statements. None have explicitly mentioned the right to self-
defense in response to terrorist attacks. The silence is striking, 
in particular, regarding the 20 legislative resolutions adopted 
under Chapter VII for the purpose of dealing with terrorist 
threats, since they offered the Council opportunities to make a 
statement of a general character similar to that made with the 
first resolution of this nature, Resolution 1373, which 
highlighted the inherent right to self-defense. The Council did 
not use them. 
Furthermore, the Council declined to mention the inherent 
right of self-defense as a result of terrorist attacks, even during 
important events such as the ten- and fifteen-year anniversaries 
of 9/11 and Osama Bin Laden’s death.160 The Council has, 
however, condemned terrorist attacks in 12 resolutions, 32 
presidential statements, and 154 press statements by members, 
detailed in Section IV(A) above. So far, neither the Council nor 
its several members ever referred to the right to self-defense 
during 2002–2015. Not all attacks during this period were 
carried out by non-State actors operating from another State, so 
there was often not an explicit need to reference Article 51. 
Consequently, the value of this specific silence is limited. These 
and other attacks offered the Council the opportunity to make 
an explicit reference to the right of self-defense, but during this 
thirteen-year period, never did.161 
 
 159. Press Statement on Tenth Anniversary of 11 September 2001, supra 
note 129. 
 160. See id. No similar releases were made on the fifteen-year anniversary 
in 2016. 
 161. See Rep. of the S.C., at 7–8, U.N. Doc. A/57/2 (June 16, 2001) 
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Although press statements, taken in isolation, are not 
decisions by the Council, in the aggregate and over a significant 
period of time, they reflect the position expressed by a much 
larger portion of UN membership. This is a result of the 
rotational character of non-permanent members—sometimes 
positions expressed by non-permanent members reflect the 
views of the region they represent.162 The press statements 
highlighted above were made by a total of 73 members: 5 
permanent and 68 non-permanent members.163 Some value 
should be attached to these statements as confirming the overall 
trend set by the Council in its formal decision to not mention the 
right of self-defense. 
In sum, there has been neither an explicit later decision nor 
a practice of invoking the right of self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors prior to Resolution 2249 by the 
Council or its members from 2002 to November 2015. There is, 
however, still the possibility of implicit subsequent decisions and 
practices in this domain during this period. To address this topic, 
it is necessary to first illustrate how the Council did make 
pronouncements related to Article 51 after 2002. 
 
[hereinafter SC 2001–02]; Rep. of the S.C., at 11–12, U.N. Doc. A/58/2 (Aug. 1, 
2002) [hereinafter S.C. 2002–03]; Rep. of the S.C., at 17, U.N. Doc. A/59/2 (Aug. 
1, 2003) [hereinafter S.C. 2003–04]; Rep. of the S.C., at 19–21, U.N. Doc. A/60/2 
(Aug. 1, 2004) [hereinafter S.C. 2004–05]; Rep. of the S.C., at 17–18, U.N. Doc. 
A/60/2 (Aug. 1, 2005) [hereinafter S.C. 2005–06]; Rep. of the S.C., at 23, U.N. 
Doc. A/62/2 (Aug. 1, 2006) [hereinafter S.C. 2006–07]; Rep. of the S.C., at 47–
49, U.N. Doc. A/64/2 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter S.C. 2008–09]; Rep. of the S.C., 
U.N. Doc. A/65/2 (Aug. 1, 2009) [hereinafter S.C. 2009–10]; Rep. of the S.C., at 
35, U.N. Doc. A/66/2 (Aug. 1, 2010) [hereinafter S.C. 2010–11]; Rep. of the S.C., 
at 52, U.N. Doc. A/67/2 (Aug. 1, 2011) [hereinafter S.C. 2011–12]; Rep. of the 
S.C., at 64–65, U.N. Doc. A/68/2 (Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter S.C. 2012–13]; Rep. 
of the S.C., at 70–71, U.N. Doc. A/69/2 (Aug. 1, 2013) [hereinafter S.C. 2013–
14]. 
 162. See SIEVERS & DAWS, supra note 25, at 129. 
 163. The non-permanent members from 2001 to 2015 were: Algeria, Angola, 
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Belgium, Benin, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Colombia, Congo, 
Costa Rica, Chad, Chile, Croatia, Denmark, Gabon, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Lebanon, Libya, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Morocco, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, Philippines, 
Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Romania, Rwanda, Singapore, Slovakia, 
South Africa, Spain, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, Togo, 
Venezuela, and Vietnam. See S.C. 2001–02, supra note 161, at 267; S.C. 2002–
03, supra note 161, at 201; S.C. 2003–04, supra note 161, at 211; S.C. 2004–05, 
supra note 161, at 223; S.C. 2005–06, supra note 161, at 223; S.C. 2006–07, 
supra note 161, at 231; S.C. 2008–09, supra note 161, at 241; S.C. 2010–11, 
supra note 161, at 219; S.C. 2012–13, supra note 161, at 252. 
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V. EXPLICIT SECURITY COUNCIL DECISIONS 
RELATED TO ARTICLE 51 OUTSIDE THE 
REALM OF TERRORISM FROM 2001 TO 2011 
Contrary to the lack of an explicit decision regarding to the 
right to self-defense from 2002 to 2015 in the context of terrorist 
threats, the Council did explicitly mention Article 51 several 
times in another realm: States’ right to import, produce, and 
retain small arms and light weapons. Before going into these 
references, however, a little history to show the Council’s 
determinations in this regard should be considered. 
The Council has referenced the right to self-defense fifteen 
times in its history. According to the Repertoire of the Practice 
of the Security Council, these references to the right to self-
defense took place about once per decade between 1950 and 
1990, with Resolutions 95 (1951),164 255 (1968),165 403 (1977),166 
and Resolution 574 (1985);167 four times in the 1990s with 
Resolutions 661 (1990) after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,168 
Resolution 984 (1995), 169 Resolution 1134 (1999) (referring to 
the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo),170 and 
 
 164. S.C. Res. 95, ¶ 3 (Sept. 1, 1951); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SECURITY 
COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1946–51, Chapter XI at 450, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1, U.N. 
Sales No. [not provided] (1954). 
 165. See S.C. Res. 255, ¶ 3 (June 19, 1968); REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE 
OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1966–68, supra note 15, Chapter 
XI at 217–18. 
 166. See S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 5 (Jan. 14, 1977); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND 
SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1975–80 (1987), Chapter XI at 402, 
http://www.un.org/en/sc/repertoire/75-80/75-80_11.pdf#page=4. [hereinafter 
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 
1975–80]. 
 167. S.C. Res. 574, ¶ 4 (Oct. 7 1985); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC. 
COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1985–88, Chapter XI at 427, U.N. Doc. 
ST/DPA/1/Add.10, U.N. Sales No. E.98 VII.1 (2000). 
 168. See S.C. Res. 661, pmbl. ¶ 6 (Aug. 6, 1990); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL 
AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. 
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1989–92, Chapter XI at 934, U.N. Doc. 
ST/PSCA/1/Add.11, U.N. Sales No. 05.VII.1 (2007). 
 169. See S.C. Res. 984, ¶ 9 (April 11, 1995); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND 
SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1993–95, Chapter XI at 1147, U.N. Doc. 
ST/PSCA/1/Add.12, U.N. Sales No. E.10.VII.2 (2009). 
 170. See S.C. Res. 1234, pmbl. ¶ 8 (Apr. 9, 1999); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL 
AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. 
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the presidential statement of September 24, 1999 (addressing 
small arms).171 A similar statement was made once in the new 
millennium prior to 9/11 with the presidential statement of 
September 4, 2001.172 Post-9/11 brought Resolutions 1368 and 
1373, along with four others. In its presidential statement of 
October 31, 2002, the Council reaffirmed: 
[T]he inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter of 
the United Nations and, subject to the Charter, the right 
of each State to import, produce and retain small arms 
and light weapons for its self-defence and security 
needs.173 
This reference to the inherent right of individual or collective 
self-defense was made again by the Council in its presidential 
statements of January 19, 2004, and February 17, 2005.174 
Lastly, in the presidential statement of March 19, 2010, the 
Council made reference to the right to self-defense in connection 
with the “Central African region.” It stated: 
The Security Council, while acknowledging the right of 
all States to manufacture, import, export, transfer and 
retain the Conventional arms for self-defence and 
security needs consistent with international law and the 
Charter of the United Nations, underlines the vital 
 
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, Chapter XI at 1168, U.N. Doc. 
ST/PSCA/1/Add.13, U.N. Sales No. 10.VII.3 (2009) [hereinafter REPERTOIRE OF 
THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99]. 
 171. See S.C. Pres. Statement 1999/28 (Sept. 24, 1999); REPERTOIRE OF THE 
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note 
170, Chapter XI at 1168. 
 172. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2001/21 (Sept. 4, 2001); REPERTOIRE OF THE 
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03, supra note 
44, Chapter XI at 1005. 
 173. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/30 (Oct. 31, 2002); see also REPERTOIRE OF THE 
PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2000–03, supra note 
44, Chapter XI at 1004–05. 
 174. See U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the 
Security Council, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2005/7 (Feb. 17, 2005); U.N. President 
of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. 
S/PRST/2004/1 (Jan. 19, 2004); U.N. DEP’T OF POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL 
AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: 
SUPPLEMENT 2004–07, Chapter XI at 1022, U.N. Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.15, U.N. 
Sales No. 13.VII.1 (2013). 
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importance of effective regulations and controls of the 
transparent trade in SALW (small arms and light 
weapons) in order to prevent their illegal diversion and 
re-export.175 
These four decisions, unrelated to terrorism, represent more 
than twenty-five percent of the Council’s references to self-
defense. This fact correlates with the lack of subsequent 
decisions regarding Article 51 in relation to autonomous non-
State actors from 2002 to 2015 and before Resolution 2249. 
In sum, the lack of explicit subsequent decisions related to 
Article 51 in the context of terrorism is not owed to the fact that 
the Council is not expected to adopt decisions related to the right 
to self-defense, or that it lacks the capacity to do so. The 
Council’s prior decisions in regard to Article 51 in other domains 
suggest this inaction in connection with armed terrorist attacks 
is a deliberate policy choice. 
VI. LACK OF IMPLICIT SUBSEQUENT PRACTICE 
BY THE SECURITY COUNCIL FROM 2002 TO 
2015 RELATED TO TERRORIST ACTS ABLE TO 
EXPAND ARTICLE 51 TO COVER 
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
GENERAL 
Could it be that the Security Council carried out implicit 
subsequent decisions and practices that, in addition to 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373, could have expanded the scope of 
Article 51 to include armed attacks by autonomous terrorist 
groups before Resolution 2249, but failed to do so?176 What 
 
 175. U.N. President of the S.C., Statement by the President of the Security 
Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2010/6 (Mar. 19, 2010); see also U.N. DEP’T OF 
POLITICAL AND SEC. COUNCIL AFFAIRS, REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE 
U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 2010–11, Chapter VII at 160–61, U.N. 
Doc. ST/PSCA/1/Add.17, U.N. Sales No. E.15.VII.1 (2016). 
 176. Resolution 2249 is an implicit decision in connection with Article 51. It 
does not mention the precept, but it is clear that the use of the words “take all 
necessary measures” includes self-defense actions. The Council has implicitly 
recognized the right to self-defense before with Resolution 403 (1977). See 
REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 
1975–80, supra note 166, Chapter XI at 402. This explicit expression is as 
follows: 
[The Security Council] Takes cognizance of the special economic 
hardship confronting Botswana as a result of the imperative need to 
divert funds from ongoing and planned development projects to 
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exactly constitutes an implicit decision and practice relevant for 
the purpose of the expansion of the right to self-defense is an 
open question. However, after the review of all the decisions by 
the Council from 2002 to November 2015 before Resolution 2249, 
the present author has identified the following circumstances 
that could be regarded as implicit decisions and practices not to 
expand the scope of Article 51: 
(i) The permanent reaffirmation by the Council of 
Resolution 1373 in almost all of its post-9/11 
resolutions177 and presidential statements, 
which would include the resolution’s reference to 
the right to self-defense. This would suggest an 
implicit subsequent decision for the purpose of 
the expansion of Article 51. 
(ii) The reaffirmation in several resolutions, 
presidential statements, and press statements 
during the period 2002–2014 of “the need to 
combat by all means, in accordance with the 
Charter of the United Nations, threats to 
international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts” or very similar wording.178 The 
 
hitherto unplanned and unbudgeted security measures necessitated 
by the urgent need effectively to defend itself against attacks and 
threats by the illegal régime in Sothern Rhodesia. 
S.C. Res. 403, ¶ 5 (Jan. 14, 1977). 
 177. See S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80; S.C. Res. 1452, supra note 81; S.C. 
Res. 1456, supra note 88; S.C. Res. 1465, supra note 89; S.C. Res. 1516, supra 
note 89; S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 79; S.C. Res. 1535, supra note 94; S.C. Res. 
1566, supra note 95; S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 102; S.C. Res. 1617, supra note 
99; S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 100; S.C. Res. 
1735, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1787, supra note 110; S.C. Res. 1805, supra note 
114; S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 115; S.C. Res. 1904, supra note 118; S.C. Res. 
1963, supra note 121; S.C. Res. 1988, supra note 125; S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 
126; S.C. Res. 2082, supra note 131; S.C. Res. 2083, supra note 132; S.C. Res. 
2129, supra note 135; S.C. Res. 2133, supra note 138; S.C. Res. 2160, supra note 
139; S.C. Res. 2161, supra note 140; S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58; S.C. Res. 
2214, supra note 153. 
 178. See S.C. Res. 1438, supra note 83; S.C. Res. 1450, supra note 83; S.C. 
Res. 1455, supra note 87; S.C. Res. 1526, supra note 93; S.C. Res. 1530, supra 
note 79; S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38; S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 79; S.C. Res. 
1617, supra note 99; S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 
100; S.C. Res. 1735, supra note 107; S.C. Res. 1822, supra note 115; S.C. Res. 
1904, supra note 118; S.C. Res. 1989, supra note 126; S.C. Res. 2133, supra note 
138; S.C. Res. 2160, supra note 139; S.C. Res. 2161, supra note 140; S.C. Res. 
2178, supra note 142; S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58. 
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use of the word “all” would tacitly be including 
the right to self-defense.179 
(iii) The Council sometimes recognized “that 
terrorism will not be defeated by military force, 
law enforcement measures, and intelligence 
operations alone” in Resolutions 1963 (2010),180 
2129 (2013),181 and 2178 (2014),182 as well as the 
presidential statement issued by the Council on 
September 27, 2010.183 This suggests that the 
use of force in self-defense against non-State 
actors is a form of military force, which was not 
excluded by the statement and is, therefore, 
implicitly allowed. 
The fact that there might be some implicit subsequent 
decisions and practices does not immediately lead to the 
conclusion that any of them in isolation or all of them put 
together, when combined with Resolutions 1368 and 1373, have 
achieved the expansion of Article 51 to cover armed attacks by 
autonomous non-State actors.184 In order to address this issue, 
each of the implicit practices will be assessed individually and 
then collectively. 
A. REAFFIRMATION OF RESOLUTION 1373 
Although it constitutes an implicit subsequent decision 
related to Article 51, the constant reaffirmation of Resolution 
1373 by the Council in almost all of the resolutions related to 
 
 179. In the past, for instance, the use by the Council of the expression “take 
all measures necessary to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity under 
the Charter” has been understood by some UN Member States to include the 
right to self-defense. See REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY 
COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1985–88, supra note 166, Chapter XI at 428. To be sure, 
the expressions “the need to combat by all means” and “take all measures 
necessary” do not have the same meaning for the Council. 
 180. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 4. 
 181. See S.C. Res. 2129, supra note 135, pmbl. ¶ 3. 
 182. See S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, pmbl. ¶ 14. 
 183. See Presidential Statement of 27 September 2010, supra note 123, ¶ 7. 
 184. It is important to mention that any implicit subsequent practice by the 
Council, in principle, would not be able to expand Article 51 on its own from 
2001 to 2015, before Resolution 2249. The expansion, though, could exist as a 
result of assessing the self-defense declarations in Resolutions 1368 and 1373, 
in light of implicit decisions and practices by the Council. 
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terrorist threats from 2002 to November 2015 does not in itself 
expand the right to self-defense against autonomous non-State 
actors in general or when combined with Resolutions 1368 and 
1373. Rather, the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 must be seen 
in the context of the thematic connection between Resolution 
1373 and the subsequent reaffirming resolution in, mainly, their 
operative parts. While Resolution 1373 has a statement related 
to self-defense, the thrust of the resolution in the operative part 
contains a multilateral effort to face the threats that terrorism 
poses to international peace and security. Thus, if the 
reaffirming resolution is multilateral in character and unrelated 
to the use of force in terms of the contents of its operative part, 
as has been the case with all of the resolutions prior to 
Resolution 2249,185 the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 must be 
understood to refer mainly to the latter’s multilateral nature. 
Consequently, the reaffirmation of Resolution 1373 by almost 
every post-9/11 resolution should not be seen as adding much 
substance to what the Council states in Resolutions 1368 and 
1373 in relation to Article 51 against terrorist attacks by 
autonomous non-State actors. 
B. REAFFIRMATION OF THE NEED TO COMBAT BY “ALL” 
MEANS 
As to the second implicit practice, the Council has 
reaffirmed in multiple resolutions and presidential statements 
“the need to combat by all means, in accordance with the Charter 
of the United Nations, threats to international peace and 
security caused by terrorist acts,” or very similar wording,186 as 
tacitly including the right to self-defense. It is possible to say 
that the implicit practice of using “all means” has important 
limits in contributing to the expansion of Article 51. In effect, 
this conclusion is supported by a contextual element of 
Resolution 1373, where the reference to the right to self-defense 
immediately precedes the use of the expression “to combat by all 
means.” The post-9/11 anti-terrorism resolutions therefore 
include “to combat by all means” and omit the “right to self-
defense.” 
 
 185. Resolution 2249 is also multilateral, but of a different nature in the 
sense that it endorses the use of force against ISIL by any State with the 
capacity to do so. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13. 
 186. See supra note 177. 
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When seen in light of the explicit multilateral effort to 
address terrorist threats, this omission is not an oversight by the 
Council. Thus, what this reaffirmed statement adds to 
Resolutions 1373 and 1368 is not enough to achieve an 
expansion of Article 51. The same can be said of the use of “to 
combat by all means” in Resolution 2249. It is incorporated in 
the preamble,187 and by including the call upon members to take 
all necessary measures in the operative part of the resolution, 
the Council gives further evidence that the statement alone does 
not imply the use of force in self-defense. 
C. REAFFIRMATION THAT TERRORISM WILL NOT BE 
DEFEATED BY MILITARY FORCE, LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEASURES, AND INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS ALONE 
The third argument in support of implicit subsequent 
decisions and practices is that the Council has recognized in 
several resolutions and presidential statements that “terrorism 
will not be defeated by military force, law enforcement 
measures, and intelligence operations alone.” Self-defense would 
be one of the military actions tacitly included. To assess the 
merits of this argument, it is important to look at the context of 
the statement in the Council’s decisions to determine whether or 
not it can be said that the statement contains an implicit 
decision supporting an expansion of Article 51 to include 
autonomous non-State actors. The context of the statement in 
the three decisions, Resolutions 1963, 2129, and 2178, does not 
support such inference, principally because all three decisions 
highlight multinational efforts as being fundamental to the fight 
against terrorism. Resolutions 1963 and 2129 contain the 
following statement in their preamble: 
[T]hat all Member States must cooperate fully in the 
fight against terrorism . . . 188 
Reiterating its call upon Member States to enhance their 
cooperation and solidarity, particularly through bilateral 
and multilateral arrangements and agreements to 
prevent and suppress terrorist attacks and encourages 
 
 187. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 13, pmbl. ¶ 7. 
 188. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 10; S.C. Res. 2129, supra 
note 135, pmbl. ¶ 18. 
396 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
Member States to strengthen cooperation at the regional 
and subregional level . . . .189 
For its part, Resolution 2178 also proclaims: 
[U]nderlining the need for Member States to act 
cooperatively to prevent terrorists from exploiting 
technology, communications and resources to incite 
support for terrorist acts, while respecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms . . . . 
Noting recent developments and initiatives at the 
international, regional and subregional levels to prevent 
and suppress international terrorism . . . .190 
Given the clear emphasis on multilateral efforts, it is unlikely 
that the statement on limitations on the use of military force 
might alone expand Article 51 to cover armed attacks by 
autonomous non-State actors in general. On the other hand, it 
would not be logical that a statement recognizing the limitations 
on the use of force could make an important contribution to the 
expansion of the right to use force in self-defense. For these 
reasons, the said statement would not even qualify as an implicit 
subsequent decision for this purpose. 
D. SUBSEQUENT IMPLICIT PRACTICES AS A WHOLE 
The fourth and final proposed argument is whether the 
foregoing implicit determinations, taken together, count as 
subsequent decisions capable of expanding the scope of Article 
51 prior to Resolution 2249. That is to say, would Resolutions 
1368 and 1373, coupled with the widely reaffirmed “all means” 
statement, have expanded Article 51 to cover autonomous non-
State actors? 
This comprehensive argument must be answered in an 
equally holistic way and in the context of other resolutions and 
later UN practices. This context is made up of the 37 resolutions, 
48 presidential statements, and 156 press statements in which 
 
 189. See S.C. Res. 1963, supra note 121, pmbl. ¶ 15; S.C. Res. 2129, supra 
note 135, pmbl. ¶ 26. The presidential statement of September 27, 2010, also 
contains a statement of virtually identical wording. See Presidential Statement 
of 27 September 2010, supra note 123, ¶ 11. 
 190. S.C. Res. 2178, supra note 142, pmbl. ¶¶ 15, 17. 
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the Council, when dealing with terrorist threats, explicitly 
embarked on a multinational effort from 2002 until 2015 without 
ever mentioning Article 51. Secondly, the presidential 
statements of October 31, 2002, January 19, 2004, February 15, 
2005, and March 19, 2010—in which the Council made an 
explicit reference to the right to self-defense in the realm of arms 
control191—indicate that from 2002 to November 2015, whenever 
the Council regarded a situation to merit reference to the right, 
it did so. 
The subsequent implicit expansion of the right to self-
defense against autonomous non-State actors seems to be 
limited in light of the above-mentioned context. This is a 
conclusion that is not affected by the tacit reference to Article 51 
in Resolution 2249, as it exclusively focused on ISIL. However, 
the fact that the Council’s subsequent explicit decisions and 
practices focused on the development of multilateral 
instruments from 2002 to 2015, prior to Resolution 2249, did not 
mean that the references to the inherent right in Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 were tacitly rejected. In effect, this is because the 
unilateral and multilateral tools used to address terrorist 
threats did not exclude each other, as Resolution 1373 
illustrates.192 
Finally, at this stage of the analysis, it is worth coming back 
to Resolution 2249 to assess the argument that it endorsed the 
United States’ and France’s arguments that self-defensive 
actions against autonomous non-State actors did not require the 
innocent State’s consent. If, as was mandated by the Court in 
Kosovo, the interpretation of the scope of Resolution 2249 must 
take into account other resolutions on the same subject-matter, 
then the interpretation that emerges is one that denies 
Resolution 2249 any wider effects beyond ISIL in Syria and Iraq, 
as such effects are not supported in any previous decisions or 
practices by the Council (which said nothing related to self-
defense beyond the important but inconclusive 9/11 
Resolutions). 
 
 191. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2002/30, supra note 173, at 1; S.C. Pres. 
Statement 2004/1, supra note 174, at 1; S.C. Pres. Statement 2005/7, supra note 
174, at 1; S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/6, supra note 175, at 1. 
 192. See generally Wood, supra note 38, at 318–19 (discussing the law 
enforcement approach in contrast to the “armed conflict” approach taken by the 
Security Council and other United Nation bodies to combat terrorism). 
398 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
VII. MULTILATERALISM IN THE FIGHT AGAINST 
TERRORISM IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY 
FROM 2001 TO 2015. 
Pursuant to Article 24 of the Charter, the Security Council 
has primary but not exclusive responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.193 The General Assembly 
also has, within certain limits provided for in Article 11 of the 
Charter,194 competences in this particular domain, as the 
International Court of Justice expressed in Nicaragua and in the 
Wall opinion.195 In light of both the Charter’s instruction to the 
Assembly to consider the principle of cooperation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security in the latter 
provision, and of the way the Assembly has applied it,196 it is not 
surprising to find that the position the Assembly has taken in 
respect to terrorism has been consistent with this principle. 
In effect, the resolutions adopted by the General 
Assembly related to terrorism have all been guided by an 
active promotion of multilateral efforts. Contrary to the 
Security Council’s response in the aftermath of the 9/11 
attacks, the General Assembly has always focused only 
on the multinational effort to fight terrorism. For 
 
 193. Article 24.1 states: 
In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, 
its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for 
the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that 
in carrying out its duties under this responsibility the Security Council 
acts on their behalf. 
U.N. Charter art. 24, ¶ 1. 
 194. Article 11.2 states: 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security brought before it by 
any Member of the United Nations, or by the Security Council, or by a 
state which is not a Member of the United Nations in accordance with 
Article 35, paragraph 2, and, except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state 
or states concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such 
question on which action is necessary shall be referred to the Security 
Council by the General Assembly either before or after discussion. 
U.N. Charter art. 11, ¶ 2. 
 195. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 95; Legal Consequences of the 
Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 
I.C.J. Rep. 136, ¶ 26 (July 9). 
 196. See Eckart Klein & Stefanie Schmahl, Ch. IV The General Assembly, 
Functions and Powers, Article 11, 1 THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A 
COMMENTARY 494–98 (Bruno Simma et al. eds., 3d ed. 2012). 
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example, while strongly condemning the attacks, the 
Assembly urgently called in Resolution 56/1 (2011): “[f]or 
international cooperation to prevent and eradicate acts 
of terrorism, and stresses that those responsible for 
aiding, supporting, or harbouring the perpetrators, 
organizers and sponsors of such acts will be held 
accountable.197 
Subsequent decisions have strengthened this path. 
Resolution 60/1, for example, contained the 2005 World Summit 
Outcome,198 in which the General Assembly reiterated the 
prohibition of the use of force in a manner inconsistent with the 
Charter and reaffirmed that “[t]he relevant provisions of the 
Charter are sufficient to address the full range of threats to 
international peace and security.”199 The resolution proceeded 
with a section on terrorism, based on multilateral tools only. It 
recalled the need for States to refrain from supporting terrorist 
organizations in any way, the necessary cooperation between 
States in conformity with international law, and the role of the 
United Nations and the contribution of bilateral and regional 
cooperation to face this challenge, among other issues. 
The United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy was 
adopted by the General Assembly in Resolution 60/288 of 
September 8, 2006.200 It is based on four pillars: (i) measures to 
address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; (ii) 
measures to prevent and combat terrorism; (iii) measures to 
build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to 
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this domain; 
and (iv) measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and 
the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against 
terrorism.201 The second pillar, measures to prevent and combat 
terrorism, listed 18 measures.202 It started with a call for 
refraining from supporting terrorist activities—giving explicit 
support to the Council’s decision in this area203—and proceeded 
with calls to members for cooperation and extradition and for 
 
 197. G.A. Res. 56/1, ¶ 4 (Sept. 12, 2001). 
 198. See G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 5 (Oct. 24, 2005). 
 199. Id. ¶ 79. 
 200. See G.A. Res. 60/288 (Sept. 8, 2006). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 5–7. 
 203. See, S.C. Res. 1189, ¶ 5 (Aug. 13, 1998); Resolution 1373, supra note 44, 
¶¶ 2(a), 2(c); see also Section VIII, infra. 
400 MINNESOTA JOURNAL OF INT'L LAW [Vol. 26:2 
their becoming parties to the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized crime and its protocols.204 It also called 
for coordination between relevant regional organizations and for 
cooperation with the CTC and the Resolution 1267 Committee, 
among others.205 
The first examination of the implementation of the strategy 
took place in Resolution 62/272 (2008), in which, among other 
statements of a multilateral nature, the General Assembly 
reaffirmed “[t]he need to enhance international cooperation in 
countering terrorism . . . .”206 The second examination of the 
strategy was carried out by the General Assembly in Resolution 
64/297 (2010). It contains a reaffirmation of several multilateral 
tools: international cooperation between States and coordination 
between regional organizations, guided by the following 
statement, among others: “Renewing its unwavering 
commitment to strengthening international cooperation to 
prevent and combat terrorism in all its forms and 
manifestations.” 207 The third examination of the strategy was 
made by the Assembly in Resolution 66/282 (2012), which 
followed the multinational orientation in terms already 
highlighted.208 The fourth examination took place in 2014 in 
Resolution 68/276. It highlights again the multilateral 
instruments mentioned above, and reaffirms that acts of 
terrorism are aimed at “[t]hreatening territorial integrity and 
the security of States . . . .”209 Furthermore, it “[u]nderlines the 
importance of multilateral efforts in combating terrorism and 
refraining from any practices and measures inconsistent with 
international law and the principles of the Charter.”210 
Clearly, there is no subsequent practice within the UN 
General Assembly related to the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors. Although this conclusion is not 
surprising, it lends further support to the lack of expansion of 
Article 51 to cover these actors. 
 
 204. G.A. Res. 60/288, supra note 200, at 5, ¶ 6. 
 205. See id. at 5–7. 
 206. G.A. Res. 62/272, ¶ 10 (Sept. 15, 2008). 
 207. G.A. Res. 64/297, pmbl. ¶ 4 (Oct. 13, 2010). 
 208. See G.A. Res. 66/282 (July 12, 2012). 
 209. G.A. Res. 68/276, pmbl. ¶ 13 (June 24, 2014). 
 210. Id. ¶ 26. 
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VIII. CAN STATE PRACTICE UNDER ARTICLE 51 ON 
ITS OWN HAVE EXPANDED THE SCOPE OF 
ARTICLE 51 TO COVER ARMED ATTACKS 
FROM ANY AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE 
ACTOR? 
The International Court included in the Kosovo opinion that 
State practice was an element to be considered regarding the 
interpretation of Security Council resolutions, which in turn 
could have an impact on the expansion of any Charter 
provision.211 Whether State practice alone from 2002 to 2015, 
and in particular during the years 2014 and 2015, could have 
achieved this result regarding Article 51 is a different matter.212 
A thorough assessment of such practice goes beyond the scope of 
this Article;213 however, it is possible to say that the practice is 
far from being uniform, even between the permanent members 
 
 211. Accordance with International Law of Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 403, 
¶ 94 (July 22) (“The interpretation of Security Council resolutions may require 
the Court to analyse . . . other resolutions of the Security Council on the same 
issue, as well as the subsequent practice . . . of States affected by those given 
resolutions.”). 
 212. Reisman and Armstrong argue that the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors crystallized into customary practice on the basis 
of State practice shortly after 9/11. See Reisman & Armstrong, supra note 2, at 
538; 548; see also Christian J. Tams, The Use of Force Against Terrorists, 20 
EUR. J. INT’L L. 359, 391–92 (2009). But see Cassese, supra note 2, at 997; 
Guillaume, supra note 2, at 547: 
It has thus been emphasized that it would that dubious to derive an 
instantaneous custom from one isolated precedent. It has further been 
observed that this evolution would amount to such radical change in 
international law that it would require a clearer practice and more 
constant opinio juris. 
 213. A future project might assess the topic in detail, particularly in light of 
the International Law Commission’s Report on Identification of Customary 
International Law. See Bernard H. Oxman, Some Observations on the Draft 
Conclusions on Identification of Customary Law Provisionally Adopted by the 
ILC’s Drafting Committee at the Sixty-Sixth Session, AJIL UNBOUND (Dec. 23, 
2014, 2:57PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/some-observations-draft-conclusions-
identification-customary-law-provisionally-adopted-ilc’s; Edward T. Swaine, 
Identifying Customary International Law: First Thoughts on the ILC’s First 
Steps, AJIL UNBOUND (Dec. 23, 2014, 3:03PM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/
identifying-customary-international-law-first-thoughts-ilc’s-first-steps; 
Michael Wood & Omri Sender, Identifying the Rules for Customary 
International Law: Response from Michael Wood and Omri Sender, AJIL 
UNBOUND (Jan. 8, 2015, 9:09AM), https://www.asil.org/blogs/identifying-rules-
identifying-customary-international-law-response-micahel-wood-and-omri. 
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of the Council, whose practice regarding ISIL before Resolution 
2249 is evidence. 
The United States and France, for example, have claimed 
Article 51 without Syrian consent,214 while Russia and China 
opposed the invocation without Syrian consent,215 and in 
September 2014 the United Kingdom similarly expressed that 
its intervention in Syria required such consent.216 Later, in 
November 2014, the United Kingdom changed its position and 
notified the Council that it had taken collective self-defensive 
action against ISIL in Syria in support of Iraq without consent 
from Syria.217 Subsequently, the United Kingdom invoked its 
own right to self-defense against ISIL in Syria, in addition to the 
collective-right of Iraq, in September 2015.218 Then, after 
resolution 2249, the United Kingdom notified the Council that it 
was taking necessary and proportionate self-defensive measures 
against ISIL in Syria, citing the resolution as a legal basis.219 
Although the United Kingdom changed its approach in 
2015, its practice is recent,220 and it is not without hesitations. 
After invoking Resolution 2249 and Article 51, an official 
 
 214. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Identical 
Letters dated 25 November 2014 from the Permanent Rep. of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, 
U.N. Doc. S/2014/851 (Nov. 26, 2014) [hereinafter Identical Letters dated 25 
Nov. 2014]. 
 215. See Blanchard, supra note 57; Black & Roberts, supra note 57, at 2. 
 216. Griff Witte & Rebecca Collard, Britain, Denmark and Belgium Join Air 
Campaign Against Islamic State, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/refugees-flee-islamic-state-bid-to-
claim-strategic-town-as-airstrikes-expand/2014/09/26/332a73f2-4570-11e4-
b437-1a7368204804_story.html?utm_term=.3a51bf5707d0. 
 217. See Identical Letters dated 25 November 2014, supra note 214.. 
 218. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Letter 
Dated 7 September 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2015/688 (Sept. 
8, 2015) [hereinafter Letter Dated 7 September 2015]. 
 219. Permanent Rep. of the U.K. of Gr. Brit. and N. Ir. to the U.N., Letter 
Dated 3 December 2015 from the Permanent Representative of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to the United Nations 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/3 December 
2015/928 (Dec. 3, 2015). 
 220. One of the latest statements endorsing the new approach was made by 
the United Kingdom´s Attorney-General. Rt. Hon. Jeremy Wright, QC MP, 
U.K., Address at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Jan. 11, 
2017) (outlining the contemporary developments in the use of force and the 
United Kingdom’s position on self defence). 
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document of the House of Commons, Legal Basis for UK Military 
Action in Syria, concluded: “However, when the armed attack 
comes from a ‘non-state actor’ such as ISIS/Daesh, based in a 
state that is ‘unwilling or unable’ to prevent the attack, the 
international law is not entirely clear.”221 Without further 
reviewing State practice regarding Article 51 predating ISIL—
carried out, among others, by the United States, the United 
Kingdom,222 Israel,223 Iran,224 Russia,225 and Kenya226—the 
above-mentioned limited review shows that the UN practice is 
not a model of uniformity. As such, States would face great 
difficulty in relying on the notion of State practice to 
demonstrate the expansion of Article 51 to cover autonomous 
non-State actors, especially since, following the Kosovo opinion, 
State actions were to be assessed in light of the 84 decisions 
adopted by the Council with its lack of reference to the right of 
self-defense. The bar is certainly high: as noted by Nolte and 
Randelzhofer, “[t]he conditions for the recognition of a 
significant reinterpretation of, or superseding exception to, Art. 
51 are strict.”227 
 
 221. Lang, supra note 69, ¶ 10. For the argument that the United Kingdom 
could invoke Article 51 against ISIL in Syria without Syrian consent (prior to 
Resolution 2249), see Letter Dated 7 September 2015, supra note 218. 
 222. See Press Statement on Terrorist Threats, supra note 10. 
 223. See Permanent Rep. of Isr. to the U.N., Security Council, Identical 
Letters dated 8 October 2003 from the Permanent Representative of Israel to 
the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of 
the Security Council, U.N. Doc. A/58/424-S/2003/972 (Oct. 9, 2003). 
 224. Iran invoked the right to self-defense against non-State actors 
operating from Iraq on April 18, 2001. See Rep. of the S.C., at 1016, Chapter XI 
(2001–2003). 
 225. See Permanent Rep. of Russ. Federation to the U.N., Letter Dated 11 
September 2001 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation 
to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General, U.N. Doc. 
S/2002/1012 (Sept. 12, 2002). 
 226. See U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on 
Somalia, U.N. Doc. S/2011/759 (Dec. 9, 2011). 
 227. NOLTE & RANDELZHOFER, supra note 15, at 1400. 
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IX. THE INDIRECT EXPANSION OF ARTICLE 51 
THROUGH A NEW STANDARD OF 
ATTRIBUTION UNDER THE SECURITY 
COUNCIL’S RESOLUTIONS ON TERRORISM 
1998–2015 
Sections IV to VI of this Article focused on what the Security 
Council did not do from 2002 to 2015: expand Article 51 to cover 
armed attacks from any autonomous non-State actor.228 Section 
VIII will focus on what the Council did—the indirect expansion 
of Article 51—in relation to the right to self-defense during this 
period regarding threats to international peace and security 
caused by non-State actors in general. It did this through the 
creation, in the domain of terrorism, of a standard of attribution 
to States of acts carried out by non-State actors that is less strict 
than that of customary international law. 
The Court has established the standard of effective control 
to determine when actions by non-State actors could be 
attributed to a State. The standard has in the past been relevant 
to the application of Article 51 to determine when an armed 
attack carried out by a non-State actor can be attributed to a 
State.229 The “effective control” test is based on the customary 
rule embodied in Article 8 of the International Law 
Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility, according to 
which “[t]he conduct of a person or group of persons shall be 
considered an act of a State under international law if the person 
or group of persons is in fact acting on the instructions of, or 
under the direction or control of, that State in carrying out the 
conduct.”230 However, despite this provision there is nothing 
preventing the development of other standards of attribution 
applicable to the UN Charter and in particular to Article 51. In 
fact, some have suggested that Resolution 1373 lowered the 
threshold of attribution applicable to non-State actors in the 
domain of threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts.231 In other words, the Security Council’s standard 
 
 228. See id. at 1417. 
 229. See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 115; Armed Activities on 
Territory of Congo (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, 2005 I.C.J. Rep. 
168, ¶ 146 (Dec. 19). 
 230. Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. 
Doc. A/56/10 (2001) [hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility]. Beginning on 
page 59, the International Law Commission provides commentaries on each of 
the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for International Wrongful Acts. 
 231. See Ruth Wedgwood, The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security 
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would cover armed attacks by non-State actors that would not 
meet the threshold of customary international law. 
A lower threshold would be the result of the combined effect 
in Resolution 1373 of the reference to the right to self-defense in 
the preamble and of paragraph 2 of the operative part, providing: 
2. Decides also that all States shall: 
(a) Refrain from providing any form of support, active or 
passive, to entities or persons involved in terrorist acts, 
including by suppressing recruitment of members of 
terrorist groups and eliminating the supply of weapons 
to terrorists; 
(c) Deny safe haven to those who finance, plan, support, 
or commit terrorist acts, or provide safe havens; 232 
The argument would suggest that, on the basis of Resolution 
1373, terrorist acts that qualify as armed attacks carried out by 
non-State actors with the active or passive support of a State 
would be attributed to the latter, and it would justify the 
invocation of the right to self-defense by the injured State. This 
Section, however, shows the legal foundations of this particular 
standard of attribution, based on decisions by the Council from 
1998 to 2015, and most importantly, that the Council itself has 
already applied the standard. 
In effect, the Council attributed the 9/11 attacks to the 
Taliban regime, despite the fact that Al-Qaida’s attacks hardly 
met the requirements of the rules of attribution under 
customary international law.233 In effect, the Council clearly did 
so in the presidential statement of September 11, 2002, which 
stated: 
The international community has responded to the 
atrocities of 11 September with unyielding 
determination. A broad coalition of States has taken 
action against the Taliban, Al-Qaida, and their 
supporters. It did so in defense of common values and 
common security. Consistent with the high purposes of 
 
Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 52, 58 (2005). 
 232. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 45, ¶¶ 2(a), 2(c). 
 233. See TOM RUYS, ‘ARMED ATTACK’ AND ARTICLE 51 OF THE UN CHARTER: 
EVOLUTIONS IN CUSTOMARY LAW AND PRACTICE 440 (2010). 
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this institution and the provisions of the United Nations 
Charter, the coalition continues to pursue those 
responsible.234 
As can be seen, the Council attributed the 9/11 attacks to the 
Taliban and regarded the self-defensive acts by United States 
and the United Kingdom as lawful under the Charter. 
This determination by the Council in terms of attribution to 
the Taliban of Al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks had its roots in four 
previous resolutions; the Council’s standard in the domain of 
terrorism was already in the making before Resolution 1373. 
Indeed, Resolution 1189 (1998) stressed a general obligation for 
UN membership: “[e]very Member State has the duty to refrain 
from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating in 
terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in organized 
activities within its territory directed towards the commission of 
such acts.”235 Later, Resolution 1193 (1998) demanded “Afghan 
factions to refrain from harbouring and training terrorists and 
their organizations and to halt illegal drug activities”;236 and 
Resolution 1214 (1998) condemned the Taliban for allowing 
territory controlled by it to be used “for the sheltering and 
training of terrorists and the planning of terrorist acts and 
reiterating that the suppression of international terrorism [was] 
essential for the maintenance of international peace and 
security.”237 In Resolution 1267 (1999), under Chapter VII, the 
Council made a similar condemnation and both in the preamble 
and in the operative part of this decision focused on the support 
the Taliban was giving to Bin Laden.238 The Council went 
further in Resolution 1333 (2000) by ordering the Taliban “to 
close all camps where terrorists are trained within the territory 
under its control.”239 
State practice before the Council under Article 51 also 
supported this development. Prior to 9/11, the United States had 
already attributed to the Taliban regimen an Al-Qaida attack 
against U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar Es Salaam, 
Tanzania, and basing its action on Article 51, the United States 
 
 234. Statement by the President of the Security Council on Sept. 11, 2002, 
supra note 55, ¶ 4. 
 235. S.C. Res. 1189, supra note 203, ¶ 5. 
 236. S.C. Res. 1193, ¶ 15 (Aug. 28, 1998). 
 237. S.C. Res. 1214, ¶ 12 (Dec. 8, 1998). 
 238. S.C. Res. 1267, pmbl. ¶¶ 5–6, ¶¶ 1–2. 
 239. S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 93, ¶ 3. 
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had attacked Al-Qaida bases in Afghanistan. The United States 
expressed that its attacks “were carried out only after repeated 
efforts to convince the Government of the Sudan and the Taliban 
regime in Afghanistan to shut these terrorist activities down and 
to cease their cooperation with the Bin Laden organization.”240 
In sum, the set of resolutions from 1998 to 2001 established 
a new standard of attribution for non-State actors’ actions to 
States in the realm of terrorism, and the presidential statement 
made by the Council on September 11, 2002, applied this 
standard by attributing Al-Qaida’s actions to the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan. Consequently, the existence of this special 
standard of attribution is not only an inference to be made in 
light of Resolutions 1189 (1998), 1193 (1998), 1214 (1998), 1267 
(1999), 1333 (2000), and 1373 (2001), but a reality in light of its 
application by the Council in its September 11, 2002, 
presidential statement. 
Could it be said that this presidential statement does not 
imply an attribution of the 9/11 attacks to Afghanistan, since 
Afghanistan is not explicitly mentioned there? The key issue is 
not whether Afghanistan is mentioned, but whether the Taliban 
were sometimes regarded by the Council as public authorities or 
with sufficient links to Afghan public organs. Once it has been 
shown that in the eyes of the Council the Taliban was a public 
authority, not a mere non-State actor, then the presidential 
statement connecting Al-Qaida’s 9/11 attacks to a State 
authority and its attribution to Afghanistan necessarily follows 
by virtue of Article 10.1 of the International Law Commission´s 
Articles on State Responsibility.241 
After its removal from power at the end of 2001, the Taliban 
became a non-State actor, but after taking Kabul in September 
1996 and until 9/11, the Security Council and the United 
Nations sometimes treated the Taliban as public authorities. 
Evidence of this treatment abounds. First, in the fact that the 
Council sometimes made reference to the “Taliban authorities.” 
In effect, when commenting on Resolution 1267 (1999), the 
 
 240. Permanent Rep. of U.S. to the U.N., Letter Dated August 20, 1998 from 
the Permanent Rep. of the U.S. to the United Nations Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council, UN. Doc. S/1998/70 (Aug. 20, 1998). 
 241. The basis of this attribution is Article 10.1 of the International Law 
Commission´s Articles on State Responsibility, which provides for: 
The conduct of an insurrectional movement which becomes the new 
Government of a State shall be considered an act of that State under 
international law. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 230, at 45 art. 10(1). 
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Repertoire of the Practice of the Security Council spoke of the 
“failure of the Taliban authorities to respond to the demands in 
resolution 1214 (1998) . . . .”242 Second, Taliban decisions were 
sometimes called “measures” in Security Council Resolutions. 243 
In addition, the Council determined that certain sanctions 
against the Taliban should also be extended to certain Afghan 
entities.244 Next, the UN recognized the political relevance of the 
Taliban by inviting it to negotiations the UN were promoting in 
Afghanistan, and the Council regretted the Taliban’s decision to 
withdraw from them.245 Fifth, the Council requested in 
Resolution 1333 (2000) that the Taliban comply with 
international conventions, such as the 1971 Convention on 
Psychotropic Substances and the 1988 Convention against Illicit 
Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.246 And 
finally, the Council tacitly accepted (in Chapter VII resolutions) 
the existence of diplomatic relations between the Taliban and 
States by urging those States to reduce the number and level of 
staff in Taliban missions and control their movement,247 and by 
ordering States to restrict the entry or transit of “all senior 
officials of the rank of Deputy Minister or higher in the 
Taliban . . . and other senior advisors and dignitaries of the 
Taliban . . . .”248 
Each of these factors is relevant for the purpose of 
categorizing the Taliban as a public authority, but two deserve 
particular attention. First, the Council’s order to the Taliban to 
comply with international conventions; and second, the 
extension by the Council of sanctions against the Taliban to 
 
 242. REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL: 
SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note 170, Chapter XI at 11116. 
 243. See S.C. Res. 1193, supra note 236, pmbl. ¶ 8; S.C. Res. 1214, supra note 
237, pmbl. ¶ 10. The word “measure” is often used in international law as 
referring to States’ and international organizations’ actions. It is not used to 
allude to those of purely non-State actors. Examples of the former abound. See, 
e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 14, 41; GATS: General Agreement on Trade in Services, 
Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade 
Organization, Annex 1B, art. XXVIII(1), 1869 U.N.T.S. 183, 33 I.L.M. 1167 
(1994); DSU, Dispute Settlement Rules: Understanding on Rules and 
Proceedings Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Marrakesh Agreement 
Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, Annex 2, art. 12, 
1869 U.N.T.S. 401, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994); Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
annex, art. 12, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015). 
 244. See Rep. of S.C., at 2, U.N. Doc. A/56/2 (2001–2002). 
 245. See Rep. of S.C., at 458, U.N. Doc. A/54/2 (1998–1999). 
 246. See S.C. Res. 1333, supra note 93, pmbl. ¶ 8. 
 247. See id. ¶ 7. 
 248. Id. ¶ 14. 
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Afghan entities shows that, for the UN organ, there was not a 
clear cut distinction, in practical terms, between the Taliban and 
the given public Afghan entities. The Taliban, as a non-State 
actor, could not be demanded to comply with the said treaties. 
In effect, the 1971 Convention on Psychotropic Substances 
provides rights and obligations for “the Parties,” not non-State 
actors,249 as does the Convention against Illicit Traffic in 
Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances.250 The fact that 
the Taliban regime is in fact Afghanistan for the purpose of the 
Conventions is the underlying basis of the Security Council’s 
order. These facts reveal that, for the Council at the time of the 
9/11 attack, the Taliban regime had, by virtue of its operation, a 
 
 249. Article 25.1 of the Convention, titled Procedure for Admission, 
Signature, Ratification and Accession, sets forth: 
Members of the United Nations, States not Members of the United 
Nations which are members of a specialized agency of the United 
Nations or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or Parties to the 
Statute of the International Court of Justice, and any other State 
invited by the Council, may become Parties to this Convention. 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances art. 25.1, Feb. 21, 1971, 1019 U.N.T.S. 
175. 
 250. Article 26 provides: 
This Convention shall be open for signature . . . by: 
a) All States; 
b) Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia; 
c) Regional economic integration organizations which have 
competence in respect of the negotiation, conclusion and application of 
international agreements in matters covered by this Convention, 
references under the Convention to Parties, States or national services 
being applicable to these organizations within the limits of their 
competence. 
Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances art. 26, Dec. 20, 1988, 1582 U.N.T.S. 95. 
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public character.251 All this took place before 9/11. Afterwards, 
no similar language was used.252 
It has been shown that a new standard of attribution in the 
realm of terrorism started to be crafted by the Council in five 
resolutions prior to Resolution 1373. The specific standard of 
attribution in the domain of terrorism has been subsequently 
and explicitly reaffirmed and expanded several times from 2002 
to 2016, with particular intensity after the emergence of ISIL. In 
effect, the operative part 2(a) of Resolution 1373 has explicitly 
been reaffirmed in the operative or the preambular parts of 
Resolutions 2133 (2014), 253 2170 (2014),254 2199 (2015),255 and 
2214 (2015)256 (the latter three being Chapter VII decisions), and 
in the presidential statements of September 27, 2010,257 May 2, 
 
 251. It is important to mention that, although the Taliban ruled Afghanistan 
from 1996 to 2001, it was not recognized as the official government by the 
United Nations. The official Afghan government opposed the Taliban and was 
a strong supporter of the measures against it before 9/11, mainly Security 
Council Resolution 1267 (1999). See REPERTOIRE OF THE PRACTICE OF THE U.N. 
SECURITY COUNCIL: SUPPLEMENT 1996–99, supra note 170, Chapter XI at 1123. 
It seems paradoxical that, despite the fact that the Taliban were not the 
recognized Afghan government, private acts could be attributed to the Taliban 
as public Afghan authorities. However, as the International Law Commission 
has expressed: 
The question of attribution of conduct to the State for the purposes of 
responsibility is to be distinguished from other international law 
processes by which particular organs are authorized to enter into 
commitments on behalf of the State. Thus the Head of State or 
Government or the minister of foreign affairs is regarded as having 
authority to represent the State without any need to produce full 
powers. Such rules have nothing to do with attribution for the 
purposes of State responsibility. In principle, the State’s responsibility 
is engaged by conduct incompatible with its international obligations, 
irrespective of the level of administration or government at which the 
conduct occurs. 
Draft Articles on Responsibility, supra note 230, at 39, cmt. 5. 
 252. It is important to mention that, prior to taking the Afghan capital in 
September 1996, the Taliban was mainly a non-State actor receiving strong 
support from, but not under the control of, Pakistan. For a detailed history of 
the Taliban in the context of the history of Afghanistan over the last 40 years, 
see William Maley, The Foreign Policy of the Taliban, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL., http://www.cfr.org/afghanistan/foreign-policy-taliban/p8609 (last updated 
Feb. 10, 2016). 
 253. See S.C. Res. 2133, supra note 138, ¶ 1. 
 254. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, ¶ 11. 
 255. See S.C. Res. 2199, supra note 58. 
 256. See S.C. Res. 2214, supra note 153, pmbl. ¶ 8. 
 257. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 17. 
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2011, 258 and May 11, 2016.259 On the other hand, operative part 
2(c) of Resolution 1373 was also reaffirmed in the operative part 
of Resolution 1566 (2004), a Chapter VII decision,260 and 
Resolution 1624 (2005),261 and also in the presidential 
statements of September 27, 2010,262 and of May 4, 2011.263 
These subsequent decisions added a new element to the above-
mentioned provision of Resolution 1373: as part of the duty to 
deny safe haven, members must prosecute or extradite persons 
who support, facilitate, participate or attempt to participate in 
the financing, planning, preparation or commission of terrorist 
acts.264 
What are the general contents of the standard of attribution 
that the Security Council has crafted in the domain of terrorism? 
From the above-mentioned set of Resolutions and Presidential 
Statements from 1998 to 2015, the contents of the standard can 
be so defined: terrorist acts carried out by non-State actors that 
reach the threshold of armed attacks and that take place as a 
result of a given State’s instigation, assistance, participation, or 
active or passive support will be attributed to the said State for 
the purpose of self-defensive action under Article 51. In addition, 
armed terrorist acts committed, financed, facilitated, incited, 
prepared, or planned by individuals who had been previously 
identified, whose prosecution and punishment or extradition to 
a State have been unsuccessfully required by others or the 
Security Council, will be attributed to the passive State for the 
foregoing purpose. 
A final question is whether a Security Council’s previous 
decision declaring that a UN member is actively or passively 
supporting terrorism, or has failed to prosecute or extradite 
individuals accused of participating in the different phases of 
terrorist acts, is required as a pre-condition to attribute armed 
terrorist attacks to the supportive State. The answer should be 
no. The events of 9/11 led to the only occasion in which the 
Council attributed an armed terrorist attack to a State: the 
 
 258. S.C. Pres. Statement 2011/9, supra note 128, ¶ 7. 
 259. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2016/6, ¶ 7 (May 11, 2016). 
 260. See S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38, ¶ 2. 
 261. See S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 100, pmbl. ¶ 15, ¶ 2. 
 262. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 13. 
 263. See S.C. Pres. Statement 2012/17, supra note 133, ¶ 11. 
 264. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1566, supra note 38, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1624, supra note 
100, pmbl. ¶ 15; S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, ¶ 5; S.C. Pres. Statement 
2010/19, supra note 123, ¶ 13. 
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Taliban and Afghanistan. This was preceded by explicit 
Council’s condemnations in Resolutions 1214 (1998) and 1267 
(1999).265 However, the text of the Resolutions and Presidential 
Statements in which the special standard of attribution has been 
established does not impose such a pre-condition. 
It could be claimed that the fact that the set of resolutions 
adopted by the Council after 2002 reaffirms States’ obligation to 
deny safe haven to terrorists and to avoid active or passive 
support to terrorist groups without expressly affirming the right 
to self-defense, as the Council did in Resolution 1373, would 
mean that such support to terrorist groups would just entail a 
violation of the resolutions but not trigger Article 51. To respond, 
it can be said that once a non-State actor’s action, which qualifies 
as an armed attack, is attributed to a State on the basis of the 
support given by the latter to the former, the applicability of 
Article 51 becomes directly possible. There is no need for a 
specific reaffirmation of the right in the Council’s resolutions 
setting forth the particular test of attribution. 
The differences between the Council’s specific standard of 
attribution in the realm of terrorism and the standard of 
attribution under customary international law are important. 
The Council requires neither evidence of effective control by a 
State of the non-State actor when carrying out the given armed 
attack nor the State’s effective instructions to do so. Thus, active 
or passive support that has made the armed attack possible is 
enough to attribute to the supporting State the terrorist armed 
attack. The Council’s standard of attribution catches much more 
private actions than that of customary international law and, for 
this reason, significantly expands the scope of the lawful 
invocation of the right to self-defense against terrorist armed 
attacks. 
X. THE NOTION OF ARMED ATTACKS IN THE 
SECURITY COUNCIL’S DECISIONS RELATED 
TO TERRORISM FROM 2002 TO 2015 
The preceding sections of this Article have shown that there 
is no subsequent practice by the Security Council on the right to 
self-defense against autonomous non-State actors from 2002 to 
2015, save the important but exceptional Resolution 2249. On 
the contrary, there have been decisions by the Council that set 
 
 265. See supra notes 233–36 and accompanying text. 
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forth a special standard of attribution to States of non-State 
actors’ actions in the domain of threats to international peace 
and security caused by terrorist acts. These two elements 
combined suggest that the existence of a terrorist attack against 
a State that could qualify as an armed attack is not in itself 
enough to trigger self-defensive actions under Article 51. The 
self-defensive action needs to be attributed to a State under the 
Council’s test of attribution or, if this is not the case, have the 
innocent State’s consent to the self-defensive operation or—after 
Resolution 2249—the Council’s endorsement or a Chapter VII 
authorization. 
As shown above, the Security Council has condemned 
terrorist attacks in 12 resolutions and 32 presidential 
statements.266 Never, however, has the Council explicitly 
labelled the terrorist acts as “armed attacks.” For instance, the 
Council used the words “horrifying terrorist attacks”267 in 
Resolution 1368, and “terrorist attacks” in Resolution 1373, 
Resolution 1390 (2002), and Resolution 1516 (2003).268 The 
Council also used the expression “bomb attacks” in Resolutions 
1438 (2002) and Resolution 1465 (2002),269 “terrorist bomb 
attack” in Resolution 1450 (2002),270 and “shameless and horrific 
attacks” in Resolution 1618.271 In recent months, ISIL’s actions 
have been labeled by the Council as “attacks” in the Presidential 
Statement of January 10, 2014,272 “large-scale offensive” in the 
Presidential Statement of September 19, 2014,273 and both 
“criminal terrorist acts” and “terrorist acts” in Resolution 2170 
(2014).274 
Nonetheless, the lack of the term “armed attack” does not 
mean that a terrorist attack cannot be regarded as an armed 
attack attributed to a State by the Council. As was shown, the 
9/11 attacks were regarded by the Council as armed attacks in 
its Presidential Statement of September 11, 2002, since the self-
defensive action was deemed by the Council as carried out in 
 
 266. See supra notes 160–62 and accompanying text. 
 267. S.C. Res. 1368, supra note 6, ¶ 1. 
 268. S.C. Res. 1373, supra note 45, pmbl. ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1390, supra note 80, 
pmbl. ¶ 4; S.C. Res. 1516, supra note 89, ¶ 2; S.C. Res. 1530, supra note 96, ¶ 2; 
S.C. Res. 1611, supra note 102, ¶ 1. 
 269. S.C. Res. 1438, supra note 83, ¶ 1; S.C. Res. 1465, supra note 89, ¶ 1. 
 270. S.C. Res. 1450, supra note 83, ¶ 1. 
 271. S.C. Res. 1618, supra note 103, ¶ 2. 
 272. S.C. Pres. Statement 2014/1, supra note 147. 
 273. S.C. Pres. Statement, 2014/20, ¶ 4 (Sept. 19 2014). 
 274. See S.C. Res. 2170, supra note 143, pmbl. ¶ 5, ¶ 1. 
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defense of “common values and common security.”275 The self-
defensive operation was lawful, so inevitably the 9/11 terrorist 
attack met the threshold of an armed attack. In addition, 
although the Council labelled ISIL’s actions as “continued gross 
systematic and widespread attacks,”276 the Council, for all 
practical purposes, regarded them as armed attacks by calling 
upon UN members to take any necessary measure, the use of 
force in self-defense included. The Council retains the power to 
make such calls even if the terrorist attack or threat is not 
explicitly deemed as an armed attack.277 
However, the Presidential Statement of September 11, 
2002, and Resolution 2249, do not imply that the existence of a 
terrorist armed attack, on its own, can serve as the sole basis for 
the invocation of Article 51. Neither can it be said that the use 
of the word “attack” by the Council in association with a terrorist 
attack in itself, and without evidence of attribution to a State, 
opens the door for lawful self-defensive actions, as some have 
suggested recently.278 As has been stated, nothing in the 
decisions and practices of the Council from 2002 to 2015 
supports this wide view. 
XI. THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST 
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS 
OPERATING FROM UNABLE BUT WILLING 
STATES 
Fourteen months before Resolution 2249, the United States 
invoked Article 51 in support of Iraq, and in so doing claimed 
that Syria’s consent was not required because it had lost control 
of significant portions of its territory.279 A similar approach was 
embraced later by the United Kingdom.280 There is no need to 
 
 275. See supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
 276. See S.C. Res. 2249, supra note 59, pmbl. ¶ 5. 
 277. See e.g., U.N. Charter arts. 24, 36, 39, 48, 51. 
 278. See Marc Weller, Striking ISIL: Aspects of the Law on the Use of Force, 
AM. SOC’Y INT’L L.: INSTIGHTS (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.asil.org/insights/
volume/19/issue/5/striking-isil-aspects-law-use-force. 
 279. See supra note 56. 
 280. The British Prime Minister expressed in November 2015, when 
explaining why UK should expand its mission in Syria: 
Isil is not just present in Iraq. It operates across the border in Syria, a 
border that is meaningless to it because as far as Isil is concerned this 
is all one space. It is in Syria, in Raqqa, that Isil has its headquarters. 
It is from Raqqa that some of the main threats against this country 
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make this type of argument when the innocent State is willing 
to offer consent for the military action against the autonomous 
non-State actor operating in its territory, as was the case with 
Syria.281 The fact that the innocent State lacks effective control 
over the territory from which the autonomous non-State actors 
operate does not mean that the territory has legally ceased to 
belong to the said State for the purpose of the principles of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity under the UN Charter.282 
Neither Resolutions 1368 nor 1373 (nor any of the other 37 
resolutions and 48 presidential statements issued by the Council 
from 2002 to 2015 in relation to terrorist acts as threats to 
international peace and security) support the view that, in the 
event of an armed attack by an autonomous non-State actor that 
cannot be attributed to a State under the Council’s standard, the 
affected State does not need the innocent State’s consent,283 
much less that the former can disregard the latter’s offer of 
consent to proceed to respond on its own terms. As with the 
Assad regime, the fact that consent was politically difficult for 
States invoking Article 51 in light of the substantial human 
rights abuses carried out by the willing State284 is not legally 
 
are planned and orchestrated. Raqqa, if you like, is the head of the 
snake. 
Nicholas Watt, Cameron Announces Plan for Commons Vote on Syria Airstrikes, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/17/
david-cameron-plan-commons-vote-syria-airstrikes. 
 281. Syria expressed this willingness. Its Foreign Minister stated, “Syria is 
ready to cooperate and coordinate on the regional and international level in the 
war on terror[.] . . . But any effort to combat terrorism should be coordinated 
with the Syrian government.” Liz Sly, Syria Warns Against U.S. Strikes on 
Islamic State on its Soil, WASH. POST (Aug. 25, 2014), http://www.washington
post.com/world/middle_east/syria-warns-against-strikes-on-islamic-state-on-
its-soil/2014/08/25/6fe98b38-2c5d-11e4-994d-
202962a9150c_story.html?tid=pm_world_pop. The fact that the offer was an 
attempt to rein in the opposition and to gain legitimacy internally and 
internationally does not deprive the offer of its legal significance under the 
Charter to ensure the territorial integrity of Syria. Differently put, nothing in 
the decisions and practice of the Security Council in the domain of terrorism 
suggest that the political motivations of the unable but willing State can 
prevent a self-defending State from requiring its consent. 
 282. See U.N. Charter, art. 2.4. See in this regard, Albrecht Randelzhofer & 
Oliver Dörr, Article 2 (4), in THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS. A 
COMMENTARY. 3d ed. VOL. I 200, 216–17 (Bruno Simma, Daniel-Erasmus Khan, 
Georg Nolte & Andreas Paulus eds., 2012). 
 283. Recent events may be creating another evolution: the existence of the 
obligation to request consent in the event of failed States. This is a topic to be 
fully explored in the future. 
 284. The UN General Assembly, for instance, declared: 
Deplores and condemns in the strongest terms the continued armed 
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relevant; there is no international law or rule establishing an 
exception to the principle of the territorial integrity of the unable 
but willing State for this reason. 
State practice highlighted by members of the Council 
provides evidence of this important consent requirement in 
operations against autonomous non-State actors operating 
within unable but willing States. For instance, in February 2015 
the members of the Council condemned Boko Haram attacks 
against Chadian soldiers in the border between Cameroon and 
Nigeria, expressing: 
The members of the Security Council noted that the 
Chadian military counter-attack against Boko Haram 
into Nigerian territory was conducted with the consent 
and the collaboration of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 
whose territorial integrity remained intact.285 
XII. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR THE LACK 
OF EXPLICIT SUBSEQUENT DECISIONS AND 
PRACTICE ENLARGING ARTICLE 51 TO COVER 
AUTONOMOUS NON-STATE ACTORS IN 
GENERAL 
This Article has shown that there has not been any explicit 
subsequent decision by the Council in relation to the expansion 
of Article 51 to cover armed attacks by any autonomous non-
State actor, with the exception of ISIL and ANF. Finally, we 
address possible explanations for the Council’s stand. The first 
explanation is that 13 years of decision-making by the Council 
on threats to international peace and security caused by 
terrorist acts have brought about a vast multilateral framework 
whose operation in international domestic spheres is closely 
monitored by the Council, and including: (i) an indirect, but 
significant, expansion of Article 51 through the specific test of 
 
violence by the Syrian authorities against its own people since the 
beginning of the peaceful protests in 2011, and demands that the 
Syrian authorities immediately put an end to all indiscriminate 
attacks in civilian areas and public spaces, including those involving 
the use of terror tactics, airstrikes, barrel and vacuum bombs, 
chemical weapons and heavy artillery. 
Rep. of the S.C., ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/70/L.47 (Nov. 2, 2015). 
 285. Press Release, Security Council, Boko Haram Attacks Against Chadian 
Troops and Civilians alongside Border between Cameroon and Nigeria, U.N. 
Press Release SC/11768-AFR/3070 (Feb. 5, 2015). 
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attribution in this realm; and (ii) the exceptional endorsement 
to act in self-defense, among other necessary measures, against 
mainly a single autonomous non-State actor, i.e. ISIL. The 
Council and its 73 members have reached agreement on these 
three strategies, which constitute in themselves outstanding 
developments in international law. The fact that the Council has 
not extended Article 51 even more does not necessarily mean 
that aggrieved States are left unprotected in legal terms, since 
consent from the State from which the autonomous actor is 
operating can be obtained before or even after the self-defensive 
action. 
The second explanation is that, while some prominent 
members may be claiming the right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors, they have not been able to carry 
the Council with them, as the situation regarding ISIL reveals. 
The permanent members disagree over the general applicability 
of Article 51 in the absence of consent from the State from which 
the non-State actors operate. As previously stated, China and 
Russia did not endorse U.S. operations in Syria without Syrian 
consent.286 Thus, a permanent member unilaterally invoked the 
right, but the Council did not support it, owing to the exercise of 
a veto power by one of its other permanent members. 
Finally, the Council surely is not unaware of the risk for 
international peace and security that the recognition of the right 
to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors sometimes 
poses. A threat to international peace prompted by an 
autonomous non-State actor involves the actor and a State. After 
the self-defensive State has acted without the innocent State’s 
consent, there is a new risk to international peace and security 
caused by the actual or potential reaction by the latter State 
against the self-defending State. In other words, in the present 
author´s view, the invocation of Article 51 may lead to higher, 
not lower, risks to international peace and security. Thus, the 
indirect expansion of Article 51, combined with the multilateral 
framework, the different perspectives among the permanent 
members, the risks to international peace and security that the 
right to self-defense against autonomous non-State actors would 
involve may explain the Council’s decision to not promote a right 
of this character. 
 
 286. See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
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XIII. CONCLUSION 
This Article has illustrated that in order to address the 
threat to international peace and security caused by terrorist 
acts, the Security Council developed three strategies between 
the years of 2001 to 2015. The first is a large multilateral scheme 
based on UN members’ cooperation and compliance with the 
Council’s decisions on terrorism. Second, through the design of a 
specific test of attribution to States of non-State actors’ actions 
in the realm of terrorism, the Council indirectly expanded 
Article 51. This test is notably less strict than its corollary in 
customary international law. Thus, the expansion through the 
Council’s subsequent decisions and practices has taken place 
within the traditional structure of Article 51, and attribution to 
a State of the terrorist attack remains as a fundamental 
requirement for the invocation of Article 51 by self-defending 
States, even more so when such attribution has been freed from 
the strict criteria of customary international law. The third 
strategy, and the latest to come into play, is the call upon UN 
members to adopt “all necessary measures” to deal with a 
particular autonomous non-State actor, ISIL being the first 
group subject to this new element. It remains to be seen whether 
or not the Council will resort to this type of decision in relation 
to other autonomous groups in the future. The Security Council’s 
decisions and practices over the given time period do not 
contemplate an inherent right to self-defense against 
autonomous non-State actors. 
Article 51 remains, in the field of threats to international 
peace and security caused by terrorist groups, in a process of 
evolution pushed by the United States, the United Kingdom, 
France, and their closest allies. However, although the process 
in the Security Council has gone a very long way, its decisions 
have not expanded Article 51 to the point that these States have 
individually claimed. 
“He had the right, since he had the might,” says the narrator 
in WAR AND PEACE, referring to Napoleon.287 Thirteen years of 
the Security Council’s decisions subsequent to 9/11 have passed, 
and Tolstoy’s words are not yet totally true for the said States in 
relation to Article 51 and autonomous non-State actors. 
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